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PREGNANCY  AND  AIDS
MARTHA  A.  FIELD*
In this Essay,  I discuss some of the points where pregnancy and
the acquired immune deficiency  syndrome (AIDS) come together-
an intersection at which a wide range of important ethical issues ex-
ist.  The  subject  illustrates  that  it  is  not  possible  to  differentiate
sharply between  ethical  and legal  issues.  Even  subjects  that  today
seem governed purely by  ethical  concerns  can become  legal issues
as enterprising lawyers  find ways  to raise  them in lawsuits.
Pregnancy and AIDS are an odd conjunction  in one sense.  We
like  to think of pregnancy as a happy  event-and often are able  to
do so.  AIDS  never appears  in that light.  But both conditions have
similar legal histories,  and both may become occasions  for govern-
ment  to  make  inroads  upon  areas  previously  left  to  individual
choice.
In current litigation, both pregnancy and AIDS are advanced as
justifications  for allowing  others  to  make decisions  for the patient.
For example, during pregnancy, others  sometimes decide that a wo-
man should undergo a Caesarean-section  operation because  that is
safer for her fetus, or that a woman  should not work in a particular
environment or lead a particular lifestyle  because it might compro-
mise her fetus's development.'  The AIDS issue has created a debate
about  criminalizing  transmission-even  by  punishing  sexual  inter-
course  in some  circumstances.2  Attempts  have also  been  made  to
*  Professor of Law, Harvard University.  This Essay is  a revised version of the 1992
Stuart Rome  Lecture on  Law  and  Ethics,  delivered  at  the University  of Maryland  on
April  15,  1992.  Many  thanks  to Rebecca Winters  and to Terry Perkins Mittman for ex-
cellent research assistance in connection with this Essay; and also to Dr. Robert Husson,
pediatrician specializing in infectious diseases at Children's Hospital, Boston, Massachu-
setts, for  keeping  me  up  to  date  on  technological  developments  and  their impact  on
infant diagnosis and therapy.
1.  See,  e.g.,  International  Union,  UAW  v. Johnson Controls,  Inc.,  111  S.  Ct.  1196,
1210  (1991)  (finding discriminatory  an employer's  "gender-based  fetal-protection pol-
icy"  and warning that "[i]t  is no more appropriate  for the courts than it is  for individual
employers  to decide whether  a woman's reproductive  role is more important to herself
and  her  family  than her  economic  role").  See generally  Martha  A.  Field,  Controlling the
Woman  to Protect the Fetus, 17  LAw,  MED.  & HEALTH  CARE  114 (Summer  1989).
2.  See generally Stephen V. Kenney, Comment, Criminalizing  HIV Transmission: Lessons
from History anda  Modelfor the Future, 8J. CONTEMP.  HEALTH  L. & POL'V  245 (1992)  (not-PREGNANCY  AND  AIDS
exclude  infected  individuals  from  schools, jobs,  insurance  pools,
and even to regulate living arrangements  by implementing such ex-
treme approaches  as quarantine.5
A  particularly  thorny  issue  where  pregnancy  and  AIDS  con-
verge  involves  the  screening  or testing  of pregnant women for the
human  immunodeficiency  virus  (HIV)  .4  I  take no issue with volun-
tary  testing,  or with making  AIDS  testing available  to anyone  who
wants it.  (Any such testing should include honest counseling  about
the advisability of testing and again should provide follow-up coun-
seling when  the  test results  are in.)  But some  suggest that testing
should be mandatory,  either for pregnant  women in  general  or for
some  subset  of pregnant  women.5  Indeed,  even  those who  reject
ing that an AIDS-specific  criminal statute would serve punishment and deterrence goals
but might  also "exacerbate  the public  health  crisis from AIDS");  Thomas W. Tierney,
Note,  Criminalizing the Sexual Transmission of HIV" An International  Analysis,  15  HASTINGS
INT'L  & COMp.  L.  REV.  475  (1992).
3.  See Wendy  E.  Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic Doctrine, 14
HOFSTRA  L. REV.  53, 53 (1985)  ("An epidemic of fear has accompanied  the spread of the
disease and with it, public attention has  turned to quarantine, one of the oldest tools of
public health."  (footnote omitted));  Edward A.  Fallone, Note, Preserving  the Public Health:
A  Proposal to  Quarantine  Recalcitrant AIDS  Carriers, 68  B.U.  L.  REv.  441  (1988).  But see
David P.T. Price, Between Scylla and Charybdis: Charting  a Course to Reconcile the Duty of Confi-
dentiality and the  Duty  to  Warn  in  the AIDS  Context,  94  DICK.  L.  REV.  435,  446  (1990)
("[M]ost states have shunned the quarantine option.").  For a discussion of the inappro-
priateness and ineffectiveness of quarantine and criminalization in response to the AIDS
epidemic,  see generally  Kathleen  M.  Sullivan  & Martha A.  Field,  AIDS and the  Coercive
Power of the State, 23 HARV.  C.R.-C.L.  L.  REV.  139 (1988).
4.  The human immunodeficiency virus  (HIV) is transmitted, inter alia, by sexual  in-
tercourse, blood  transfusions,  and by  maternal  transmission to a  fetus  or infant.  The
virus manifests  itself in various stages.  First, it may lie dormant.  A second stage, termed
AIDS-Related  Complex  (ARC),  includes people  who are symptomatic  but not fully  so.
Finally, there  is the acquired immune deficiency syndrome  (AIDS)  itself, "characterized
by  HIV infection,  severe  immune deficiency,  and a secondary  illness that  is potentially
fatal."  See  Edward  N.  Brandt, Jr.,  Health Care  Workers and AIDS,  48  MD.  L.  REV,  1,  3-4
(1989).
5.  See  infra note  19 and accompanying text  (detailing Florida's requirement of pre-
natal testing of pregnant women for sexually transmitted diseases,  including AIDS).  Cf.
Larry Gostin, Hospitals, Health Care Professionals, and AIDS:  The  "Right to Know"  the Health
Status of Professionals and Patients, 48  MD.  L.  REV.  12,  13  (1989)  ("The Surgeon General
has advocated  HIV screening of all pre-operative  patients.  Some hospitals, irrespective
of what the law may  allow, already  screen their patients without specific informed  con-
sent."  (footnotes omitted));  A.  Alyce  Werdel, Mandatory AIDS  Testing:  The Legal, Ethical
and Practical  Issues, 5  NOTRE  DAMEJ.L.  ETHICS & PUB.  POL'Y  155, 219 (1990)  ("Mandatory
testing is justifiable  in the AIDS context because certain groups are known  to be at high
risk of carrying  the disease.  Based  on  this  knowledge,  the state has  a duty  to protect
others not  within  these classes.").  But see  Taunya  L.  Banks,  Women  and AIDS-Racism,
Sexism,  and Classism,  17 N.Y.U.  REV.  L.  & Soc.  CHANGE  351,  370  (1989/1990)  (warning
that "routine  HIV prenatal  screening may prompt many HIV-infected  women  to forego
needed prenatal  care to  avoid detection  of their antibody  status").
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mandatory testing in most circumstances  may favor testing pregnant
women.
I believe  that mandatory  testing of pregnant women should  be
avoided.  Moreover, testing of newborns at birth for HIV should not
be undertaken without  a parent's consent.  Testing a newborn,  like
testing  the pregnant  woman  herself, reveals  whether  the  mother is
HIV  positive.  Official  receipt of this  information  suggests  the fur-
ther  inquiry:  Should government  attempt to  control  pregnancy  in
women known to be HIV positive?  Some, for example, would favor
abortion  and  sterilization  for  AIDS-infected  women,  or  govern-
ment-supported  encouragement  of  Norplant  or  Depo  Provera.6
How should one distinguish between encouragement  and coercion,
and is  coercion permissible?
In this Essay,  I  review the law and the legal issues surrounding
the particular intersection of pregnancy and AIDS and analyze, from
an  ethical  and  legal  perspective,  how  the  issues  ought  to  be  re-
solved.  In  general,  I  conclude  that  neither  pregnancy,  potential
pregnancy,  nor AIDS should  serve  as the occasion  for government
coercion.
The approach  we take to the AIDS crisis, and to the regulation
of pregnancy, may affect other, larger issues.  For example:  To what
extent, and in what circumstances,  is it permissible for government
to decide who should and who should not reproduce or parent?  Are
there any circumstances where the government should encourage or
even require abortion,  contraception, or sterilization?  Should it go
further and adopt a licensing system for parenting,  reserving permis-
sion to parent for those who can demonstrate themselves before the
fact to be fit?  Could the government go so far as  to criminalize preg-
nancy by unauthorized  persons?  And,  finally, as the biotechnologi-
cal revolution continues,  to what extent will government control new
reproductive possibilities  and to what extent will individuals exercise
the new options?7
6.  See  Banks, supra note  5,  at 363  n.55  (noting  that one  commentator  has  argued
"that  it might  be ethical to counsel women  infected with  HIV  not to have  children  ...
[or]  to abort").  Cf. Sandy  Banisky,  City  Officials Planning to Promote Norplant, THE  SUN
(Baltimore),  Dec.  3,  1992,  at  IA  (reporting city  plan  to  promote  use of the  Norplant
contraceptive  among  teenagers  to  combat  "an  adolescent  pregnancy  rate  among  the
country's  highest").
7.  For example, as  in vitro (or laboratory)  fertilization becomes  more widely avail-
able, ethical  debates have  begun to  emerge.  May  parents  select  which embryo  will be
implanted  based  on  its gender?  Could  they  select  its genetic  characteristics,  thereby
screening out embryos having a prognosis of disability, or of being too short, or having
brown  eyes?  Will  the state  be permitted  to  regulate  the degree  to  which  parents can
"select"  the characteristics  of their future child?  If the potential parent is not permitted
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Some of these inquiries seem distant from current realities.  But
what  we  do  with  more  immediate  AIDS-related  or  pregnancy-re-
lated issues,  like mandatory testing, may chart our course on larger
questions  like  these-oftentimes  without  adequate  reflection.  We
particularly  need  to  guard  against  new intrusions  upon individual
decision making prompted either by a panicked response to AIDS or
by political  use of the AIDS epidemic.'
Our response to AIDS will be felt on many levels.  The way we
respond  to  AIDS-related  issues-for  example,  patients'  access  to
care and physicians'  duty to treat-will affect our entire health  care
system and its  regulation.  It will also  affect how our constitutional
law  develops,  particularly  in  two  ways:  (1)  how  our  Constitution
protects the privacy of the individual  to make major life decisions, in
the face of twin onslaughts from government power and technology;
and  (2)  how  our Constitution  protects  the  equality  of all  groups
before the  law.  Because  pregnancy and AIDS  involve such difficult
and far-reaching policy and ethical issues, it is essential  that our re-
sponse be a  thoughtful, reflective  one.
I.  THE FACTS  CONCERNING  VERTICAL  TRANSMISSION
The  process  of  transmitting  HIV  from  mother  to  child  is
termed "vertical  transmission."  It is estimated  that there are about
4000 cases  of pediatric  AIDS  in the United  States  today;  most  in-
fants acquire the virus from their mothers through vertical transmis-
to make these determinations, will government  itself be able to choose, or is no selection
permissible at all?
8.  See  David  I.  Shulman,  AIDS  Discrimination: Its Nature, Meaning and Function,  12
NOVA  L.  REV.  1113,  1115-17  (1988)  (arguing that the "panic  response"  to AIDS  is due
to the fear underlying  societal taboos  related to human sexuality,  social stigma, helpless-
ness,  mental  illness,  and  death).  One  commentator  has  summarized  the problem  as
follows:
Politicians have reacted  to  the public's erroneous fear that AIDS  is  highly con-
tagious by  proposing numerous legislative  programs  intended  to prevent the
spread of the disease.  Many of these proposals  call for testing and quarantine
programs under circumstances the scientific community has called unwarranted
and  absurd.  As  a  result, the dangers  posed  by AIDS  now stretch  beyond  its
infectious and lethal nature  and extend to the threat it poses to fourth amend-
ment  rights.
Bernadette P. Sadler, Comment,  When Rape Victims'  Rights Meet Privacy Rights:  Mandatory
HIV Testing, Striking the Fourth  Amendment Balance, 67 WASH.  L. REV.  195,  195  (1992)  (foot-
notes  omitted).  Many of the same points could be made about reacting to the epidemic
of crack-addicted  babies by enacting legislation intended  to regulate their mothers' drug
intake.
1993] 405MARYLAND  LAW  REVIEW
sion.9  One out of every 800 women  in this country is  estimated to
be HIV positive, and women  constitute about  ten percent of all re-
ported  AIDS  cases.' °  Most  of  these  women  acquired  the  virus
through  intravenous  (IV)  drug use  or through  sexual  intercourse
with an IV drug user."
When a woman who is HIV positive becomes pregnant, there is
a  thirty percent  or less chance  that the baby she produces  will  also
be  infected.' 2  Interestingly,  it has  not been  proven that  there  is a
greater  chance of transmission  if the pregnant woman  actually has
AIDS  and  therefore  has  a  higher  level  of HIV  in  her body.'"  A
newly  infected  woman  who  is  not at  all  ill has  the same  chance  of
passing on the infection,  even though she has a much lower level  of
the virus.  Indeed,  some researchers  theorize  that the fetus  is most
likely to  become  infected  during  the period when  the mother  first
9.  See Centers  for  Disease  Control, HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report, 39  MORBIDITY  &
MORTALITY  WEEKLY  REP.  1  (1990)  (noting that transmission  from  mother  to  child  ac-
counts for more  than 80%  of pediatric  AIDS  cases).
10.  Centers  for Disease Control National AIDS  Hotline, Oct. 30,  1992.  About  1800
AIDS-infected babies are born in the United States each year.  Marta Gwinn et al., Preva-
lence of HIV Infection in Childbearing Women  in the United States, 265 JAMA  1704  (1991).
11.  See john a. powell  & Eileen  B.  Hershenov, Hostage to  the Drug War:  The National
Purse, the  Constitution and the Black  Community,  24  U.C.  DAvIs  L.  REV.  557,  602  (1991)
(reporting that "[miore  than sixty percent of the 4,000 women in New York City thus far
diagnosed  with AIDS  are IV drug users");  Shawn  M.  Boyne, Note,  Women in Prison with
AIDS:  An Assault on  the Constitution?, 64  S.  CAL.  L.  REV.  741,  752  (1991)  (noting that
"52%  of the women with the HIV virus studied in research conducted by the Centers for
Disease  Control became  infected  through intravenous  drug use").
12.  Harvard AIDS  Institute, Nationwide Study Investigates Perinatal Transmission of HIV,
MONTHLY  REP.,  Sept.  1989, at  10.  Estimates  of the rate of transmission  have  decreased
over time, from about 40%  in  1985,  Centers for Disease  Control, Heterosexual Transmis-
sion of Human T-Lymphotropic Virus  Type Ill, 4  MORBIDrrY  & MORTALITY  WEEKLY  REP.  561
(1985),  to the current figure, which some also believe is too high.  The European Collab-
orative Study Group found a transmission rate of only  12.9%.  European Collaborative
Study, Children Born to  Women with HIV-  1  Infection: Natural History and Risk of Transmission,
337  LANCET  253  (1991).  Some  have theorized  that the chance of transmission  may in-
crease for subsequent pregnancies.  See Paul H.  Black & Elinor M.  Levy,  The HIV Seroposi-
tlive State and Progression to AIDS:  An Overview of Factors Promoting  Progression,  4 NEw  ENG. J.
PUB.  POL'Y 97,  99 (1988).
13.  See William  Borkowsky  & Keith  Krasinski, Perinatal  Human Immunodeficiency  Virus
Infection:  Ruminations on Mechanisms of Transmission and Methods of Intervention, 90  PEDiAT-
RICS  133 (1992).  The authors  do suggest, however,  that the presence  of AIDS or  HIV-
related  secondary  infections  may  increase  the likelihood of transmission  if these  infec-
tions affect the mother's production  of HIV-fighting antibodies or result in a "leaky  pla-
centa."  Id.  Moreover,  some  researchers  have  taken  the  position  that  the  rate  of
transmission  does  increase  as  the  mother's  disease  advances.  See  David  D.  Ho  et  al.,
Quantitation of Human Immunodeficiency Virus  Type  1 in the Blood of Infected Persons, 321  NEW
ENG.J.  MED.  1621  (1989).
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becomes  infected. 14
It is  not entirely  certain  how or  when  the vertical  transmission
from pregnant woman to fetus takes place.  Three different time pe-
riods  are  usually  considered  relevant-pregnancy,  birthing,  and
breastfeeding-and  it is agreed that infection may occur at different
stages.15  Some in the medical community speculate  that the earlier
the fetus  is  infected,  the earlier  the infant  will  develop  AIDS  from
the HIV  infection,  and  the earlier  the infant  will die.  Researchers
reason  that very  early  transmission  can result in  interference  with
the development of the immune system, which hampers  the infant's
ability to produce her own HIV-antibodies. 1 6
Interestingly,  one-third  of infants  born  infected  with  HIV  de-
velop  AIDS within  the first year; these infants  generally  die by age
three.  The other  two-thirds  who are  infected  do not immediately
develop AIDS and can survive for many years.  One child born with
HIV  is now  fifteen.
17
II.  MANDATORY  TESTING  AND  INFORMED  CONSENT
The usual rule in medicine-for  testing as well as for operations
and  other  treatments-is  that  the  patient  has  the  right  to  decide
whether  to consent.'"  The  physician must  persuade  the  patient to
14.  See  Phillip A.  Pizzo  & Karina M.  Butler, In the Vertical Transmission of HIV, Timing
May be Everything, 325  NEW  ENG. J. MED.  652,  653  (1991).
15.  While information on the timing of HIV transmission is unresolved, these three
stages  are  the ones  most commonly  discussed.  Some  believe  that most  transmission
takes  place  during  birthing.  See,  e.g.,  Susanne  Lindgren  et  al.,  HIV and Childbearing:
Clinical Outcome  and Aspects  of Mother-to-Infant Transmission, 5  AIDS  1111  (1991); John
Modlin & Alfred Saah, Public Health and  Clinical  Aspects of HIV Infection and Disease in Women
and Children in the United States, in AIDS,  WOMEN,  AND  THE NEXT  GENERATION 41  (Ruth R.
Faden et al. eds.,  1991); John T.  Repke  & Timothy R.B. Johnson, HIV Infection and Obstet-
ric Care, in AIDS,  WOMEN,  AND  THE  NEXT  GENERATION,  supra, at 94.  Doctors  Borkowsky
and Krasinski,  however,  state that at least  50%  of all perinatal  infection occurs  during
gestation and, indeed, the virus has been detected in fetal material aborted as early as  18
weeks.  See  Borkowsky  &  Krasinski,  supra note  13,  at  133.  There  have  been  very few
cases of transmission through  breastfeeding.  Even in those cases,  doctors do not know
if transmission occurred  through the milk  (which has  been shown  to contain  the virus),
through mother's blood which  was  in the milk, or through mother's blood that can col-
lect  around the  nipple.  The  CDC currently recommends  that HIV-positive  women  in
the United  States not breastfeed.  Telephone  Interview  with Mary Jo O'Hara,  National
Pediatric  HIV  Resource Center  (Oct.  21,  1992).  The  World Health  Organization  has
declined to  offer the same advice,  on the theory  that the  risks of transmission through
breastmilk are outweighed  by  risks of starvation  without breastfeeding.  Id.
16.  Interview with  Mary Jo O'Hara, supra note  15.
17.  Id.
18.  See Cruzan v. Director, Mo.  Dep't of Health,  497 U.S.  261,  269-70  (1990)  ("The
logical  corollary of the  doctrine of informed  consent  is that the patient  generally  pos-
sesses  the  right not  to  consent,  that  is,  to  refuse  treatment.").  Cf. Union  Pac.  Ry.  v.
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agree to any procedure that the physician wants to perform, and the
patient  retains  the  right  to  refuse.  Most  hospitals, physicians,  and
lawmakers  have  adhered  to  that  principle  in the  context  of AIDS
testing and, for that matter,  in the  general  context of testing preg-
nant  women  to  detect  fetal  characteristics  such  as  Down's  Syn-
drome, spina bifida, and sickle cell anemia.  A few statutes, however,
have  imposed  mandatory  testing  of pregnant  women  for  AIDS.
Florida, for example, requires prenatal testing for AIDS as part of a
requirement of testing pregnant women  for all sexually transmitted
diseases.19
Some hospitals also may engage  in screening pregnant women,
sometimes not openly.20  Indeed, some state statutes explicitly allow
physicians  to  test  simply  on  the  basis  of the  patient's  consent  to
medical  care, without  even  informing  the patient  that  she is  being
tested for HIV.
2 1  In other places,  courts  can order testing of preg-
nant women.  A Missouri statute, for example,  allows  courts  to re-
quire testing when there "are  reasonable grounds to believe that an
individual  is  infected  with  HIV  and  there  is  clear  and convincing
evidence  of a  serious and  present health threat  to others posed  by
Botsford,  141  U.S. 260, 261  (1891)  ("No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded  by  the common  law,  than  the right of every  individual  to  the possession  and
control  of his  own  person,  free  from  all restraint  or interference  of others,  unless  by
clear and  unquestionable  authority of law.").
19.  FLA.  STAT.  ANN.  §§  384.23(3), 384.31  (West Supp. 1992).  Similarly, a Mississippi
statute allows  physicians  to make medical decisions  for pregnant women, rejecting their
ability to unreasonably  refuse treatment.  Miss.  CODE  ANN.  §  41-41-3  (Supp.  1992).
For a discussion of the inappropriateness  of including AIDS as  a sexually transmit-
ted  disease under these  statutes, see  Sullivan  & Field, supra note  3,  at  171-72.  In New
York State Society of Surgeons  v. Axelrod,  555 N.Y.S.2d  911  (1990),  a group of medical
societies  that  favored  mandatory  testing  sued  the  New  York  State  Commissioner  of
Health  to  have  AIDS  and HIV  infection  listed  as  sexually  transmitted,  communicable
diseases  so  that they  would  be  subject  to  mandatory  testing  under  existing state  law.
The suit was not  successful.
20.  Keith  Henry et al.,  Human Immunodeficiency Virus Antibody  Testing:  A  Description of
Practices and Policies at U.S. Infectious Disease-Teaching  Hospitals and Minnesota Hospitals, 259
JAMA  1819,  1820 (1988)  (noting that 34%  of all United States Infectious  Disease-teach-
ing hospitals  responding  to  a  survey  "estimated  that  the  consent  of the  patient  was
rarely obtained when an HIV antibody test was ordered").  See Gostin, supra note 5, at 36
(warning that "[w]here  patients are unaware  that an HIV test will be given,  their consent
is fraudulently  obtained"  (footnote omitted)).
21.  See  ARK.  CODE  ANN.  §  20-15-905(c)  (Michie  Supp.  1991)  ("Informed  consent,
information,  and counseling are not required for the performance of an HIV test when,
in the judgment of the physician,  such testing is medically indicated to provide appropri-
ate diagnosis and  treatment  to  the subject  of the test, provided that the subject of the
test  has  otherwise  provided  his  or  her  consent  to  such  physician  for  medical
treatment."),
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the  individual  if  infected."22  But  to  test  without  consent,  and
equally,  to trick  a woman into giving a paper "consent,"  is to aban-
don  principles  of informed  consent that are  basic to  medical  prac-
tice in this country and that many associate with individual freedom.
The Supreme Court has said that the right to make one's own medi-
cal  decisions  is  protected  by  the United  States Constitution.23
III.  THE  RIGHT NOT  TO  KNOW
Should someone have a right to refuse a test for HIV?  After all,
no  treatment  is  required  as  a  result  of the  test-at  least  not  yet.
Purely  as  a  blood  test,  AIDS  testing  is  not particularly  intrusive.
Should people have the right to object even  to learning the truth?24
One physician  has  called allowing  "people  at risk of being infected
with  HIV  voluntarily  to choose  not  to  know  [whether  they  are in-
fected]  a  perversion  of  human  rights  and  a  formula  for  HIV
disaster."
2 5
Why would anyone refuse to consent to an AIDS test?26  There
are  different  types  of  considerations  an  individual  might  weigh
against  the  benefits  of testing  in  reaching  a  decision.  First,  there
would be  great and indisputable  costs  in  having other people  know
that  one  is  HIV  positive.  Even  in  places  where,  in  theory,  a  test
would be confidential,  the reality  may be that it is  difficult  to main-
tain total confidentiality once a person is found to be HIV positive.27
And  some  states  do not  even  afford  a  pretense  of confidentiality,
22.  Mo. ANN.  STAT.  § 191.674(1)  (Vernon  Supp.  1992).
23.  Cruzan v.  Director, Mo.  Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.  261,  278 (1990)  ("[A]  consti-
tutionally protected  liberty interest in refusing unwanted  medical  treatment may  be in-
ferred from  our prior decisions.").
24.  This proposition  assumes that the result the test reveals  is correct, as  it usually-
but not invariably-will  be.  For a  discussion of the possibilities  and causes of error in
testing for HIV,  and a description of the types  of testing required to  achieve maximum
accuracy,  see Martha A. Field,  Testing For  AIDS:  Uses and Abuses,  16 AM. J.  L. & MED.  33,
40-43  (1990).
25.  Robert T,  Jensen,  HIV Testing of Pregnant Women and Newborns, 265 JAMA  1525,
Mar. 27,  1991  (letter to the editor).
26.  Larry  Gostin,  executive  director  of the  American  Society  of Law,  Medicine  &
Ethics,  has explained,  "As  with  many medical  tests that predict grave  or fatal  diseases,
some patients prefer to know the information, while others  do not."  Gostin, supra note
5,  at  37-38.  Gostin  further  noted  that the  informed  consent  doctrine  generally  "lays
down  a patient-oriented standard for the information  that must be disclosed by the phy-
sician."  Id. at 36.
27.  See  id. at 47 ("[B]y  collecting sensitive health  care data, hospitals  may find them-
selves under great pressure to disclose that information.  Another possibility is that the
information  may  be disclosed intentionally  or carelessly  by persons with access  to medi-
cal  files.").  Moreover,  some scholars  believe  it would  be a mistake  even  to attempt  to
ensure  confidentiality,  given  the interest of other persons, such as lovers,  insurers, and
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instead  requiring  physicians  to  inform  the  state health  department
and  then allowing the information  to be subpoenaed."8  Moreover,
some  insurance  companies,  potential  employers,  health  mainte-
nance  organizations,  and others  now  ask  applicants  whether  they
have ever  been  tested  for AIDS,  or whether  they  know  if they  are
HIV positive.29  Indeed  Missouri's  statute, for one, requires  a  per-
son  who  knows she is HIV  positive to inform  any health  care  pro-
vider of that fact prior to receiving care. 3 0  It is sometimes therefore
safer-even  physically  safer-not  to be  tested  for AIDS.  The  test
can jeopardize  access  to employment,  health care,  and housing.
In addition,  there can be enormous  social  costs, especially  for
poor women.  According  to the Working  Group on HIV Testing of
Pregnant Women and Newborns,  the  extent  to which  HIV-positive
women suffer because of their diagnosis has not been systematically
documented,  but "recent evidence  suggests that poor, minority wo-
men  risk the devastation  of their personal  and family relationships,
the loss of social  and  medical  services,  the loss  of control of their
own medical  decisions, and even the loss of their children."'
A  different  kind  of reason  to  avoid  AIDS  testing-a  reason
much  more important to some  persons  than to others-is  a  simple
desire  not to  know  the result.  Such a reason  might prevent  some
persons  from  being  tested even  if the results  were  not  to  be  dis-
treating physicians,  in  learning the information.  See Harold Edgar  & Hazel Sandomire,
Medical Privacy Issues in the Age of AIDS:  Legislative Options, 16 AM. J.L. & MED.  155 (1990).
28.  See  ARK.  CODE  ANN.  § 20-15-906  (Michie  Supp.  1992);  IDAHO  CODE  §§  39-602,
606 (Michie  Supp.  1991); Mo.  ANN.  STAT.  §  191.653(3)  (Vernon Supp.  1992).
29.  After disclosure is made, companies  may act on the information.  For example, in
McGann  v.  H & H Music Co., 946  F.2d 401  (5th Cir.  1991),  cert. denied, 113  S.  Ct. 482
(1992),  the court held that ERISA did not forbid an employer from changing an existing
insurance policy that otherwise  provided lifetime medical  benefits up to $1,000,000,  to
limit  lifetime coverage  for AIDS-related  benefits  to  $5000.  The  change was  instituted
after an AIDS-afflicted  employee filed claims for reimbursement.  The company's  desire
to avoid  the expense of paying for AIDS  treatment was  considered a sufficient justifica-
tion.  Id. at 404.
30.  Mo.  ANN.  STAT.  §  191.656(5)  (Vernon Supp.  1992).  Arkansas has a similar provi-
sion.  ARK.  CODE  ANN.  § 20-15-903  (Michie  Supp.  1990).
31.  Working Group on HIV Testing of Pregnant Women  and Newborns,  HIV Infec-
tion, Pregnant Women,  and Newborns:  A  Policy Proposal  for Information and Testing, 264 JAMA
2416, 2418  (1990).  In one study conducted  in a high-incidence  area of New  York City,
for example, only one-half of the women who  gave birth without having received prena-
tal care agreed to submit to voluntary  testing.  See David Chambers, Public  Policies Regard-
ing Families, in THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF  AIDS  18,  19 (National Academy  of Sciences  1991).
See also Banks, supra note 5,  at 370 ("The stigma of a positive HIV antibody test-loss of
employment, insurance, housing, and other economic or social harm-provides  another
reason  for women  who  suspect  they  are  infected  with  HIV  to avoid  routine prenatal
screening.").
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closed  to anyone  else,  as  would  be the case  at  anonymous  testing
sites,  which  are an available alternative  in some states. 3 2  The wish
not to know will  often, though not always,  be  stimulated  by  a fear
that the result could be positive. 3  People differ greatly concerning
whether they  would want to  face a  terrible  disease.  Such  reactions
are not limited to AIDS,  by any means.
Huntington's  Disease provides another example.  It is an incur-
able  neurological  disorder  that  gradually  destroys  the  brain  cells
over a period  of twenty years from the onset of the illness,  usually
sometime during  middle  age.  The  disease  is  hereditary;  a  person
who  carries  the  gene for the  disease  has  a  fifty  percent  chance  of
passing it on to her or his children.  In 1986, researchers  first devel-
oped a  test enabling people  whose parents had the gene, and who
therefore had lived with  the uncertainty  of knowing they had a fifty
percent  chance  of developing  Huntington's  Disease  in  their  own
middle  age,  to  determine  whether  in  fact  it had  been  passed  to
them.  During the  first five years  following  the development of the
test, however, only 200 of the  125,000 persons at risk had taken the
test.  Many of the persons  involved agonized  about whether or not
they preferred  to know their actual status.3 4
A right not to know  in  situations  like these  should be  seen as
part of the constitutionally  protected  liberty  interests that  the cur-
rent Supreme Court has recognized  in Cruzan v. Director,  Missouri De-
partment of Health " and Planned Parenthood  of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v.  Casey.36  The right not to know also bears a relationship  to Justice
Brandeis's  pivotal justification  for  recognizing  a  fundamental  pri-
vacy  interest in  a democracy:  "the  makers of our Constitution...
conferred,  as  against  the  government,  the  right to  be  let alone-the
most comprehensive of rights  and the right most valued by civilized
men."
37
32.  For  a discussion  of the desirability  of anonymous  testing and  how it works,  see
Field, supra note 24,  at 51-53.
33.  See  Gostin, supra note 5,  at 52 (stating that "[situdies  indicate that positive  HIV
test  results  can  cause  severe  psychological  distress,  including  an  increased  risk  of
suicide").
34.  Giovanna Brea, For a Family Facing  Incurable Huntington's  Disease, Finding  Out is  Bet-
ter Than the Dread of Suspicion, TIME,  Nov. 5,  1990.
35.  497  U.S. 261  (1990)  (stating that a competent person has  a constitutionally  pro-
tected  liberty interest  in refusing unwanted  medical  treatment).
36.  112  S.  Ct.  2791  (1992)  (stating that  the Constitution  places  limits  on  a  state's
right  to interfere  with a citizen's  "most  basic  decisions"  about family, parenthood,  and
bodily integrity).
37.  Olmstead  v.  United States,  277  U.S.  438,  478  (1928)  (Brandeis, J.,  dissenting).
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Whether or not exercise of this right is the "correct"  approach
is  another question-the  answer to which  might be affected  by  the
availability  of early  and effective  treatment  for people  carrying  the
virus.  But whether or not the right choice  seems  clear, making the
choice  reflects  and is  part of one's  evolving  individuality.  It is  the
right of personal autonomy, the right to develop such individuality,
that is at the heart of the freedom that the Fourteenth  Amendment
protects. 3 8  Like  the  decisions  involved  in  Cruzan (the  "right  to
die"),  Casey (the right that previability  abortion not be made crimi-
nal),  and  Griswold v.  Connecticut 9  (the right  to  use contraception),
deciding whether or not to know one's medical  diagnosis is a subject
on  which  there  are  "intimate  views  with  infinite variations,  [which
have a]  deep,  personal character."4 °  Like abortion and  other deci-
sions protected by Fourteenth Amendment rights to privacy and lib-
erty,  these  decisions  involve  "the  most  intimate  and  personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime,  choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy. "41
Even on a more basic level, cases like Cruzan and Casey are appli-
cable here, because  what is  at issue  is  the  right to make one's  own
medical  decisions.  Whether we speak of the right  to refuse medical
treatment, as  in Cruzan, or the right  to obtain it, as  in Casey, we are
dealing with a constitutionally protected  liberty interest.  Mandatory
testing eviscerates  a woman's  right  to make her own medical  deci-
sions,  and  requires  instead  that  she  submit  to  medical  decisions
made  by  the state.
The state should not be permitted to impose testing for disease,
forcing a  person  to confront  her health status,  especially  when the
government  has  no  compelling  need  for  the  information  that  the
test will reveal.  In the case of AIDS, a positive  test will fundamen-
tally and dramatically  affect a mother's life without serving any com-
pelling or even important  need of government. 42  Testing  will not
38.  U.S.  CONST.  amend. XIV.
39.  381 U.S.  479 (1965).  Justice Douglas concluded  his opinion by  recognizing that
when the Court confronts  family issues, "[w]e  deal with a right of privacy older than  the
Bill  of Rights-older  than  our  political  parties,  older  than our  school  system."  Id. at
486.
40.  Casey,  112 S. Ct. at 2808.
41.  Id. at 2807.
42.  See Gostin, supra note 5,  at 53 ("Compulsory screening in health care facilities...
would not be an efficacious  public health policy:  there  is little documented  risk of occu-
pational transmission;  knowledge  of a patient's HIV-antibody  test result  would  be un-
likely  to  further  decrease  the  already  low  risk;  and  screening  would  pose  wholly
disproportionate  psychological and  social burdens  on the individual,  and financial bur-
dens on the  [health care professional]  and the health  care facility.").
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prevent  vertical  transmission.  A  basic  difficulty  with  the  case  for
forcing testing, or even strongly encouraging  it, is that no particular
treatment  may  result  from  the  diagnosis,  and  little  direct  benefit
flows from learning the result.43  Of course, that may change, and it
was truer  in  the past  than it has  been recently.  Today,  treatments
such  as AZT and other drugs have become available  that might be
helpful to the mother during or directly after pregnancy.  But such
treatments are not available even to everyone who wants and needs
them;  they  will  not  necessarily  follow  upon  a  diagnosis  of AIDS,
even  in cases  where they would be medically  advisable.
IV.  GOVERNMENT  NEEDS  AND  PURPOSES
Why then does government take the position that it is better for
persons to know their status if they are HIV positive?  One common
supposition  is  that  persons  will  take  greater  precautions  to  avoid
spreading  infection  if they  know  they are  positive  than if they  do
not.  But  that  is  not  necessarily  the  case.  Some  people  react  to
learning  they carry AIDS with anger at being infected and a willing-
ness  or even  desire  to spread it to others.44  There  are stories  like
that of the notorious Gaetan Dugas,  a Canadian airline steward  also
known  as  Patient  Zero,  who  reportedly  told  his  doctors  that  he
would not give  up unprotected  sexual intercourse  even  though he
knew  he  was  HIV  infected.45  At  the  other extreme,  many  others
who do not know their status do take precautions-both to avoid in-
fecting  themselves  and  to  protect  others  from  any  infection  they
might carry.  Indeed, many believe that such an attitude of universal
precautions, to be exercised in all circumstances and without regard
to one's  HIV status,  is  the  safer approach  to adopt  in  confronting
the AIDS dilemma.  Public promotion  of such an  approach  for  all
would  accomplish  far more  than  mandatory  testing-either of the
general population  or of subgroups.4 6
Of course, when the subject of testing is pregnant women, gov-
ernment  can  argue  it  has  purposes,  and  that  testing  has  effects,
which do not exist when the test is imposed on others  in the popula-
43.  See Banks,  supra note 5, at 369 (finding "[t]he  practical value of routine HIV pre-
natal screening  [to be]  questionable").
44.  See Marshall  Forstein,  Understanding  the Psychological  Impact of AIDS:  The Other Epi-
demic, 4  NEW  ENG. J.  PUB.  POL'Y  159,  166  (1988).
45.  See Sullivan &  Field, supra note 3,  at  153  n.48.
46.  See  Field, supra note  24,  at  59-60;  see also  Larry  Gostin  et  al.,  The  Case Against
Compulsory Casefinding in Controlling AIDS-Testing, Screening and Reporting,  12  AM.  J.L. &
MED.  7,  20-21  (1987).
1993] 413MARYLAND  LAW  REVIEW
tion.  And for some, pregnancy  is indeed  the special case  that war-
rants mandatory  testing.47
The  principal  effect  one  would  expect  from  testing  pregnant
women  is  that those who  learn they are  HIV  positive  will consider
whether to abort.  Many health professionals and others believe that
a  woman  should  abort  upon  learning  she  is  HIV positive,  rather
than take  the approximately  thirty percent chance of giving birth to
a  child  who  is  infected.4"  The  woman  herself may,  however,  see
things  in  a different  light.49  Indeed,  when a woman  learns  that she
has  tested  positive,  she may look to  the seventy  percent  chance  of
having a child who is not infected as a wonderful opportunity.5"  She
may be encouraged  in this attitude  because  it does not appear that
pregnancy  is harmful  to the health  of the HIV-positive  woman.5'
There  is  no  evidence,  then,  that  compelled  testing  will  en-
courage abortion-an  especially  ironic  state interest anyway,  given
the vehemence  of the government's effort to discourage abortion in
other contexts.  As long as there continue to be no significant thera-
pies or treatments for improving  the life  of the fetus or mother-to-
47.  See Jensen,  supra note 25.  Others  favor  routine, but  not necessarily mandatory
testing.  See  Marcia Angell, A  Dual Approach to the AIDS Epidemic, 324  NEw  ENG.  J.  MED.
1498,  1499  (1991).
48.  The  CDC,  for  example,  has  long  taken  the  position  that  HIV-positive  women
should "delay"  pregnancy.  Centers for Disease  Control,  Recommendations  for Assisting in
the  Prevention  of  Perinatal  Transmission  of  Human  T-Lymphotropic  Virus  Type
lI/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus and Acquired Immunodeficiency  Syndrome, 34  MORBIDITY
& MORTALITY  WEEKLY  REP.  721  (1985);  see also Ronald Bayer, Perinatal  Transmission  of HIV
Infection:  The  Ethics of  Prevention, 32  CLINICAL  OBSTETRICS  &  GYNECOLOGY  497,  499
(1989); John D.  Arras,  AIDS and Reproductive Decisions: Having Children in Fear and Trem-
bling, 68  MILBANK  Q.  353,  353-54  (1990).
49.  Evidence  suggests  that  HIV-positive  women  are  not more  likely  to abort  than
others.  See Peter A. Selwyn et al., Knowledge of HIV Antibody Status and Decisions to Continue
or Terminate Pregnancy Among Intravenous Drug Users, 261 JAMA  3567  (1989).
50.  Women  who  are HIV  positive may  desire to spend their final  days producing  a
new  life, even  when childbirth  may result  in  their death.  For discussions  of the issues
involved when  HIV-positive women consider abortion, and the different roles  that race,
class, and  education  can  play in  these  deliberations,  see  Leroy Walters,  Ethical Issues in
HIV Testing During  Pregnancy, in AIDS,  WOMEN,  AND  THE NEXT  GENERATION,  supra note 15,
at  274,  277-278;  Ruth  R.  Faden  et al.,  Prenatal  Screening and Pregnant Women's  Attitudes
Toward the Abortion of Defective Fetuses, 77  AM.  J.  PUB.  HEALTH  288  (1987).
51.  Marie Louise  Newell,  HIV-Infection in Pregnancy, 4  AIDS  5111,  5112  (1990).  But
cf. Lindgren  et  al.,  supra note  15,  at  1115  (opining  that  pregnancy  has  no effect  on
asymptomatic  HIV  but  may  accelerate  HIV  disease).  At  Newark  Children's  Hospital,
physicians maintain that pregnancy  is not dangerous  to an HIV-positive woman if her T-
cell count is  high enough, but if the count is below  200, pregnancy is  risky to her.  Tele-
phone Interview with MaryJo O'Hara,  National Pediatric  HIV Resource Center (Nov. 3,
1992).
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be  when  the pregnant  woman  is  diagnosed  as  HIV  positive,  such
testing will remain purposeless.
One  of the problems  with  discussing  the  connection  between
mandatory testing and therapies that may help the pregnant woman
and her fetus is that women have, until recently, been excluded from
various AIDS studies.52  Prior to 1990,  those women who were per-
mitted to participate were prohibited from being or becoming preg-
nant.  Therefore,  the  treatment  of  pregnant  women-either  to
preserve their  own  health or to reduce  the rate of transmission  to
the fetus-was  largely  unexamined.  In  1990,  in  response  to  criti-
cism of this  clear bias,  a protocol  study  called  AIDS Clinical Trial
Group protocol  was developed.  Originally,  the  trial  involved  only
treating newborns  with AZT because  of a reluctance  to administer
AZT to pregnant women.  But thereafter the trial was altered  so wo-
men  in their third trimester of pregnancy would be given  AZT, and
the  infant  would  continue  to  receive  the  drug for  six  weeks  after
birth.
53
Women's  groups  harshly  criticized  this modification,  claiming
that women were only permitted to use AZT while pregnant if inves-
tigators  felt the fetus would not be harmed.54  Some elements of the
scientific  community agreed that the focus  of the test should be on
preserving  maternal  health,  regardless  of the effect  on  the  fetus.
The FDA reviewed  the new proposal  and decided that  the focus of
these tests should indeed be on women and not on risks to the fetus.
Accordingly,  Clinical  Protocol  076  currently  enables  all  pregnant
participants  to  receive  AZT.  Moreover,  all  receive  the  drug
throughout  their  pregnancy,  rather  than  some  merely  receiving  a
placebo.55  The effect of the AZT on either the woman or the fetus,
however, has not yet been conclusively determined.
52.  See Ilise  L.  Feitshans,  Confronting AIDS in the  Workplace:  Balancing  Employment Op-
portunity and Occupational Health Under Existing Labor Laws,  1989  DET.  C.L.  REV.  953, 960
(noting that women  "have  been  ignored  by  AIDS  studies in  the United  States  until re-
cently"); Roy G.  Spece, Jr., AIDS:  Due Process, Equal  Protection, and the Right to Treatment, 4
ISSUES  L. & MED.  283, 309  (1988)  ("Women and children might be excluded from AIDS
studies because of possible  tort liability concerns.").
53.  See  Deborah  Cotton,  AIDS Clinical Research and Drug Regulation, in THE  SOCIAL
IMPACT  OF AIDS  31,  35  (National Academy  of Sciences,  1991).
54.  Id.  In  a  preliminary  study of 40 women  given  AZT during  the  third trimester,
there were no cases  of birth  defects.
55.  See FDA Clinical Protocol 076, Phase  3 Randomized Placebo Controlled Trial to Evalu-
ate  the Efficacy,  Safety  and Tolerance of Oral AZT  in Pregnant HIV-Infected  Women  and Their
Infants (19xx).  (As of Mar.  3,  1993,  only 642  of the expected  1496 patients  had  been
found  for the  study.)
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This is not to say that if therapies develop that could benefit the
fetus-a  drug that helped protect  it from infection,  for example-
the pregnant woman should lose her right to decide whether to con-
sent  to  treatment.  Different issues  would  be posed  if the  therapy
appeared  harmless  to the pregnant  woman  than if it seemed  risky
for her, but in  either event, the mother's right to decide on appro-
priate  treatment  should  continue  unabated.  A  woman's  right  to
control  medical  decisions  that  implicate  her body  and  her health
does not end because  she is pregnant.  She should be treated as an
individual in her own  right,  and not  simply  as  a vessel  for fetuses.
Nor  should  she  be  conceptualized  as  simply  the  conveyor  of
disease. 6
Another possible scenario  would exist if AZT or another drug
administered during pregnancy to HIV-positive women proved ben-
eficial to the mother but detrimental to the developing fetus.  Again,
I would contend that the choice whether to proceed belongs to the
pregnant  woman,  and  that  the  physician's  obligation  is  simply  to
give her full and fair information to guide her decision.  But if such a
conflict between the interests of mother-to-be and developing child
were shown actually  to exist, some would doubtless favor taking ac-
count of the interests  of the child-to-be in order to limit  the preg-
nant  woman's  options.  In  any  event,  such  an  approach  is
inappropriate when  no conflict between  mother and child has  been
demonstrated.
When medicine develops  a  way to put the information that the
patient is seropositive  to good use-for the benefit of the patient or,
in the case of a pregnant women, of her fetus-and when that medi-
cal advance  is available to the poor as well  as  the rich, there  will be
more reason to encourage pregnant women to undergo testing.  But
even  then,  the  choice  should  always  remain  with  the  pregnant
woman.
V.  EUGENICS
Some would argue, however,  that the  government's  usual anti-
abortion stance is wrong, and that it should not be ashamed even to
encourage  abortion  when  the fetus  has approximately  a  thirty per-
cent  chance  of acquiring  AIDS.  The  government  would  be  "pro-
56.  See generally Field, supra note  1 (proposing a flat rule that women not be subject  to
governmental  coercion because of pregnancy);  Martha A. Field, Pitting  the Fetus Against Its
Mother, in  1 EMERGING  ISSUES  IN  BIOMEDICAL  POLICY:  AN  ANNUAL  REVIEW  (Robert H.
Blank & Andrea L. Bonnicksen eds.,  1992).  See also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pa.  v. Casey,  112 S. Ct. 2791,  2810 (1992);  In re A.C.,  533 A.2d 611,  615-16 (D.C.  1987).
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tecting"  the  child  in  the odd  sense  that it  would  be  preventing  it
from  being  born,  despite  its  seventy  percent  chance  of  being
uninfected.  Such  a  position  would  also  save  the  substantial  costs,
usually  borne  by  the government,  that are  associated  with  a  child
who  has been born  with AIDS.57
Indeed,  some would  favor even  greater controls.  Sterilization
of HIV-positive women  might also  be encouraged, 58  or use of Nor-
plant  (an  implanted  contraceptive  that  prevents  conception  for
about five years),  or Depo Provera  (a newly-approved  and compara-
tively inexpensive contraceptive involving a shot that prevents preg-
nancy  for  about  three  months).59  And  why  focus  simply  on
encouraging abortion,  sterilization,  or the use of Norplant?  Is  there
any reason that government could not require such measures,  at least
for  the subset  of HIV-positive  women,  if it is  convinced  that  they
should not reproduce?  And if government can control HIV-positive
women and prevent them from having children, then perhaps there
is, after all, a use for mandatory testing and the information it would
yield.60
57.  The  cost  of caring for  HIV-infected  infants has  been  estimated  at  one  billion
dollars annually.  Howard L. Minkoff, AIDS in Obstetrics, 32 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS  & GYN-
ECOLOGY 421  (1989).
58.  See  Banks,  supra note  5,  at  371-72  (warning that  "HIV-infected  women  may  be
coerced or directed to abort if pregnant or to be sterilized if of childbearing age").  Pro-
fessor  Banks  also  asserted  that  "[a]  government  policy  which  advocates  sterilization
through  directive counseling of fertile  HIV-infected women  ...  is precisely  the kind  of
interference  with private  decision making  that Skinner and Roe attempt to prevent."  Id.
at 379.
59.  See supra note 6 and accompanying  text.  Recent  efforts to  discourage  poor and
minority women  from having children include  the Bush administration's  proposed pol-
icy of cutting off welfare for single mothers who have  another child, announced in April
of 1992 with  the avowed aim of improving Bush's  electibility.  Then-Governor  Clinton
as well, during the presidential  campaign, spoke of a two-year limit on welfare and indi-
cated  that he would be  willing  to  allow states to "experiment"  with  their welfare  pro-
grams even by cutting off aid  to poor women who continued to have children.  See Linda
C. Rehkopf, Playing Politics of Resentment, ATLANTA  CONST.,  Apr.  18, 1992.
The stance of the former Bush administration  on "encouraging smaller families"  is
especially  ironic given  its  simultaneous campaign  to deny  legal abortions  to poor peo-
ple.  In many  cases,  the  result  of these  policies  will not  be  preventing  single  mothers
from  having  another  child,  but rather reducing  the  level of payments  to  her growing
family.  As long  ago  as  1970,  the  Supreme  Court  upheld  a  statute that  had  a  similar
effect on poor women.  In Dandridge v.  Williams, 397 U.S.  471  (1970),  the Court upheld
a limitation  on  the amount  that  families  could  receive  under  the Aid  to Families  with
Dependent Children  program regardless  of family  size.
60.  Criminalization  is another method  that might be employed  to coerce HIV-posi-
tive  women  not  to  have  babies,  or  to  punish  them  if they did.  While  it  seems  almost
incredible  that pregnancy  could  be made  criminal  for  any  subset of women,  there are
criminal transmission  statutes  today that would  seem  literally  applicable  to  pregnancy.
For example,  Idaho's statute  makes it  a felony,  punishable  by up  to  15  years  in prison
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In this way, mandatory AIDS testing is a step in the direction of
government  control of eugenics, and a  step we  should be reluctant
to take.  It represents our government  inserting itself into decisions
of reproductive  choice-not  in  the  anti-abortion  stance  we  were
most familiar with during the Bush and Reagan administrations,  but
as a promoter of abortion for reasons  of cost  efficiency and eugen-
ics.  This is  a step toward a policy, increasingly  a matter of concern
as  possibilities  for  allowing  government  control  increase,  of  al-
lowing government  bureaucrats  and  statisticians  to decide who  can
and who  cannot parent.6'
If persons  with  AIDS  cannot  parent,  who  else should  be pre-
cluded?  Surely  drug addicts  and  incurable  alcoholics  would  seem
vulnerable  to  control,  for  their habits  can  and  do  harm  their off-
spring,  even  before  birth.  Should  persons  who  have abused  chil-
dren in  the past  also be  excluded  from  parenting?6 2  Persons  with
serious hereditary conditions such as cystic fibrosis or Huntington's
Disease,  and poor people,  who,  after all,  might not be expected to
provide  as  well  for  children  as  persons  with  a  secure  source  of
income?
A  serious  question  to  consider  in connection  with  mandatory
testing,  then,  is  whether  we  want  government  participating  in  the
and a $5000 fine,  to "expose  another [to HIV]  in any manner  with the intent  to infect."
IDAHO CODE  § 39-608 (Supp.  1992).  While  the statute was not  enacted with pregnancy
in mind, a woman could arguably be prosecuted under it if the pregnancy was  intended.
The defense, of course, would be that there is, presumably, no specific  intent to infect the
offspring, but only an intent  to procreate.  Still,  a prosecutor might contend that know-
ingly  exposing  a fetus to the risk of HIV  satisfies  that element of the offense.  Further,
even if the pregnancy was not intended, the woman might possibly be prosecuted on the
theory that when she continued the pregnancy  knowing she was HIV positive, she satisfied
the intent  requirement.  Missouri's  statute explicitly uses  a lower mens rea requirement,
making  it criminal  to "deliberately  create a grave and  unjustifiable risk of infecting  an-
other  with  HIV  through  sexual or  other contact  when  an  individual  knows  that he  is
creating  that risk."  Mo.  ANN.  STAT.  § 191.677.1  (Vernon Supp.  1992).
61.  Current  issues involve  whether the government should license  surrogacy, as  the
state  has  traditionally  done  in  the  context  of adoption,  and whether  the state  should
regulate  who  may  parent  through artificial  insemination  or in  vitro  fertilization.  The
United  States government has generally avoided regulation  in these areas, although the
medical  profession  sometimes  has  provided  its own  controls  that just  as substantially
limit parental choice.  In other countries, Denmark for example, government  limits  who
may use even  simple reproductive  technology like  artificial insemination, although there
are no  government-imposed  limits upon  who can  parent  "naturally."  Discussion  with
Danish  participants at  the  Seventh World  Conference  of the International  Society  on
Family  Law,  Motherhood and Fatherhood  in a Changing Society,  May  15,  1991,  held  at
Opatija, Yugoslavia.
62.  Cf. People  v. Pointer,  199  Cal.  Rptr. 357  (Cal.  Ct.  App.  1984)  (holding that a
condition of probation that included prohibition of conception for a woman convicted  of
child endangerment  was  overbroad).
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abortion decision at all.  In fact, this  is a serious and troubling issue
even when it is only government encouragement that is contemplated.
And those who would strike the balance by favoring encouragement
but  not  force  must  further  decide  at  what  stage  encouragement
slides into forbidden  coercion.63
Government  control  could  extend  even  beyond choosing  who
may parent.  Genetic  studies  and other analyses may be performed
on the fetus  itself, and  "inferior"  fetuses can  be  flushed  out, while
"superior"  ones  are promoted.  Through  so-called advances  in  re-
productive  technology,  the medical  profession  is  achieving  greater
opportunities  for knowledge about, and  control  over, what  kind of
persons will be brought into the world.  Society is acquiring the op-
portunity to reduce the element of chance and replace  it with plan-
ning and  deliberation.  Should we welcome these developments,  or
are they more threatening than beneficial?  Even if they do present a
welcome  opportunity,  how  should  we justly  decide  what  types  of
people to allow  or to encourage?
It is  an interesting  exercise  to  take a moment  to  contemplate
what kind of people you would encourage  if you were the decision-
maker.  Linus  Pauling,  a  nobel  laureate  in  chemistry,  found  it
problematic
that the  majority of donors  [of semen for artificial insemi-
nation]  are from a professional  group [physicians]  that, on
the average, may have some desirable qualities,  but that...
is not the professional  group that leads in intelligence  (av-
erage IQ),  and that failure to discuss the question of selec-
tion  of donors  may  well be  causing  us  to  . . . reject[]  an
opportunity to improve the human race in a small but nev-
ertheless significant  way. 64
Pauling called for legislation setting "certain  minimum standards  of
health,  desirable  characteristics,  and family  history  for  donors. '"65
But should there be only minimum standards?  And how should any
standards  be  chosen?  Even  if  "intelligence"  could  be  gauged,
would that be the right measure?  Happiness, or perhaps generosity,
might  be preferable,  although  we  would  have to  research  and de-
63.  See supra note 62  and accompanying  text.  If the prohibition  against  conception
had not been  overturned  on appeal  and  Pointer became pregnant, could  the state  have
insisted on abortion?
64.  Linus Pauling, Reflections on the New Biology,  15 UCLA L.  REv. 267, 271-72 (1968).
Pauling's  comment on  the medical  profession was  drawn  from  an  observation of Her-
mann  Muller.
65.  Id. at 272.
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bate  whether  those  characteristics  have  any  genetic  component.
Others  doubtless  will  think  of other  characteristics  they  consider
more  important still.
These  issues  concerning  positive  eugenics  may  still  seem  re-
mote  today.  Negative  eugenics-eliminating  the  "unfit"-is,  how-
ever,  part  of  the  current  landscape.66  For  nearly  two  decades,
controversy  has raged  over elimination of newborns who have  disa-
bilities.67  The issue usually posed is  whether parents  have the right
to decide not to provide treatment, on the theory that the child will
have  a poor quality of life and  is essentially "better  off dead."  Dur-
ing the Reagan administration, the White House attempted to elimi-
nate  parental  and  medical  discretion  not  to  treat  a  newborn  for
reason of its disability,68  a move  that was  only partially successful.69
In other ways,  however,  government  has  encouraged  elimina-
tion of newborns  with handicaps.  It has promoted prenatal diagno-
sis  of some  disabilities,  especially  those  associated  with  mental
retardation,  by  funding  amniocentesis.7"  Moreover,  public  funds
have  been  available  for  abortion  more  readily  when  the  fetus  is
66.  See John R. Harding, Jr., Beyond Abortion:  Human Genetics and the New Eugenics,  18
PEPP.  L.  REV.  471,  478  (1991)  (explaining that "[niegative  eugenics seeks to reduce  or
eliminate  deleterious  genes, while  positive  eugenics  encourages  desirable  or superior
traits").
67.  See generally Martha  A. Field, Killing "the Handicapped," 16 HARV.  WOMEN'S  L.J.  -
(forthcoming 1993).
68.  The Reagan  administration's  Baby  Doe  guidelines  tried to  accomplish  this  by
applying  §  504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. §  794  (West Supp.  1988),
to  the  treatment  of newborns  with  handicaps.  See  Discriminating  Against  the  Handi-
capped by Withholding Treatment or Nourishment;  Notice of Health Care Providers, 47
Fed.  Reg.  26,027  (1982);  Nondiscrimination  on  the  Basis  of Handicap,  Interim  Final
Rule, 48 Fed. Reg. 9630 (1983)  (invalidated by American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heck-
ler, 561  F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C.  1983)); Nondiscrimination  on the Basis of Handicap; Pro-
cedures  and Guidelines  Relating to  Health Care for Handicapped  Infants, 49 Fed.  Reg.
1622 (1984)  (invalidated on technical administrative law grounds  by Bowen  v.  American
Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986)).  For a thorough discussion of the Reagan Guidelines,
see  U.S.  COMM'N  ON  CIVIL  RIGHTS,  MEDICAL  DISCRIMINATION  AGAINST  CHILDREN  WITH
DISABILITIES  61-78  (1989).  The Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457,
and  its implementing regulations,  see 50  Fed.  Reg.  14,878,  extended  and amended  the
Child  Abuse  Prevention and Treatment  Act of  1978,  to  cover denial  of medical  treat-
ment to disabled infants.
69.  See U.S.  COMM'N  ON  CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 68, at 103-10  (finding a "likelihood
of widespread denials  of lifesaving  treatment to children  with disabilities that have con-
tinued since implementation  of the Child Abuse Amendments  of 1984 [supra note 68] on
October  1,  1985").
70.  One recent  study  found  that  all  50  states  pay  for amniocentesis  through  their
Medicaid  programs.  Study  Tracks Medicaid Payments for Abortions, MOD.  HEALTHCARE, June
4,  1990, at  12,  14.
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handicapped.
7'
Even  though  the  United  States  government  has  not  required
abortion when prenatal testing shows that the fetus will have disabil-
ities,  the  steps  it  has  taken  to  encourage  prenatal  diagnosis  and
abortion  cross  the line  forbidding  government  interference  in  re-
productive  choice  through  encouragement  of abortion.  Our gov-
ernment  has  also  thereby  discriminated  against persons  who  have
disabilities,  in violation  of the  Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment 72  and the Americans with Disabilities Act.73  But
although  I consider  such government  conduct illegal and unconsti-
tutional,  it  is  widely  practiced  and  has  been  little  challenged  to
date. 74
One issue therefore is  whether government should ever get in-
volved in reproductive  control, either for the purpose of producing
persons who are genetically "better,"  or in order to eliminate  those
it considers  least  fit.  Moreover, if wholesale governmental  involve-
71.  By labeling  abortion for disability  as "medically  necessary"-defined  to  include
those where "the fetus is physically deformed, mentally deficient, or afflicted  with a con-
genital illness"-Iowa  provides otherwise  unavailable  funding to cover such  abortions.
1991  Iowa Legis.  Serv.  270  § 103 (West).  Virginia pays  for abortions through  its state
medical  assistance fund when "the fetus will be born with a gross and totally incapacitat-
ing physical deformity or with a gross and totally incapacitating mental deficiency."  VA.
CODE  ANN.  § 32.1-92.2  (Michie  1982).  Similar provisions  have been proposed,  but not
yet passed, by  several other state legislative  bodies.  See, e.g.,  1991  Mo. H.B.  75 (author-
izing Medicaid payment for abortion when there is  "severe  fetal deformity" or when  the
pregnant woman tests positive for HIV);  1991  Tenn. H.B.  1522. A  1988 study predating
the Iowa law  found  that  13  states paid for abortion  for fetal handicap.  See  Study  Tracks
Medicaid Payments for  Abortions, supra note  70.
72.  U.S.  CONST.  amend.  XIV,  §  1.
73.  42 U.S.C.  §§  12101-12213  (Supp. I 1990).  See  Field,  supra note 67.
74.  Indeed,  more persons have  objected  to government  restrictions on the ability  to
abort fetuses  deemed disabled  than to  government  encouragement  of abortion  in this
context.  Some have argued  that a state that bans  postviability abortion  must nonethe-
less  make  an exception  when  the pregnant  woman learns  her fetus  will have  a  serious
disability and that such a woman has a constitutional  right to abort and to choose not to
have a disabled  child.  See Curt S.  Rush, Note,  Genetic Screening, Eugenic Abortion, and Roe
v. Wade:  How  Viable is Roe's  Viability Standard?, 50 BROOK.  L. REV.  113,  142 (1983).  My
position, by contrast, is that the state cannot permissibly make abortion for disability any
easier  to  obtain than  any  other elective  abortion,  and  that to do  so violates  both  the
Equal  Protection Clause  and  the Americans  with  Disabilities Act.  Field,  supra note  73.
This position would invalidate even rather common statutory rules allowing abortion for
"fetal  deformity."  While  the position was crafted with other disabilities  in mind, it sug-
gests  as well  that any  rules making it  easier  to abort  HIV-infected  fetuses  than others
would be unconstitutional;  if government wants  women to be allowed  to abort because
they are HIV positive, it must make elective abortion available to all.  Only in those cases
where the pregnancy  poses a risk  to the health of the mother-to-be, see supra text accom-
panying notes  54-56, should the abortion  be considered a  "therapeutic"  one that must
be available  to  the pregnant woman.
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ment is  eschewed and few are to be encouraged or forced to abort,
why  should AIDS-infected  women be  the group  that is  controlled?
After all,  a  person  in  that  group  has  a  seventy  percent  chance  of
having  a  noninfected  baby.  Furthermore,  she  may  have  a partner
who is willing and able to provide well for their offspring, even when
she becomes  ill or dies.
VI.  THE  INEFFICACY  OF  MANDATORY  CONTROLS
Even apart from  issues  of the rights  of the women who would
be tested, a powerful argument against imposing testing on particu-
lar groups, like pregnant women,  is that testing will not work to slow
the spread  of HIV,  or  to accomplish  any  other legitimate  govern-
ment purpose.  Not  only  is  universal  precautions  a  more  effective
approach  than  the vain  effort  to  sort  the population  into  infected
and uninfected segments, but also the attempt  to impose testing on
women who do not want it will be counterproductive.  If forced test-
ing becomes part of prenatal care, it will drive pregnant women who
do not want to be tested away from the other components of prena-
tal care as well.  They will be less able  to make intelligent  decisions
during  pregnancy  and  protect  the  health  of their  potential  off-
spring.75  If testing is a condition of admission to the hospital, when
women learn of that fact, then women who do not want to be tested
will  simply  give birth elsewhere under less safe conditions.
Indeed, money  spent on imposing mandatory  testing could  be
put to  much  better use by  providing free prenatal  care for women
who  cannot otherwise  obtain it, and  on developing  other prenatal
health  strategies.7 6  Such  steps  would  do  far  more  to  protect  the
health  of the  next generation  than mandatory  testing of pregnant
women  ever could.
Accordingly,  it  is  difficult  to justify  imposing  testing-either
upon  pregnant  women,  or  upon  other populations  that  might  be
targeted.  Even apart from any civil liberties concerns,  forced testing
is  a  misuse  of  resources  and  is  counterproductive.  In  deciding
whether to impose testing, society is not choosing between  the public
health and our civil  liberties,  although  the issue is  often so framed
75.  See  Banks, supra note 5, at 370-72.
76.  In other contexts,  screening infants for diseases has actually  thwarted  continued
research  on  the  disease,  as  public  funds were  channeled  instead  into  the testing.  See
Katharine  L. Acuff & Ruth  R.  Faden,  A  History of Prenatal  and Newborn Screening Programs:
Lessonsfor the Future, in AIDS,  WOMEN,  AND THE  NEXT GENERATION,  supra note  15, at 59, 66
(discussing  effects of mandatory  screening  programs  for syphilis,  PKU,  sickle cell  dis-
ease, Tay-Sachs,  neural  tube defects,  and Hepatitis  B).
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by proponents of coercive controls.  Both public health and civil lib-
erties are harmed by coercive state action.  In addition to the futility
of mandatory  controls,  the  threats  to  civil  liberties  are  enormous.
These range from abandoning informed consent and coercing med-
ical  testing  or  treatment,  to making  special  regulations  to  govern
AIDS,  and  to  promulgating  special  rules  to  govern  pregnant  wo-
men,  to  name  but  a  few  of the varied  possibilities.77  The  threats
loom  even larger  when  one  bears  in  mind  the slippery  slope  that
exists,  not only between  the different  groups  of people who  might
be subjected'to AIDS testing, but also concerning the variety of con-
ditions or traits that might be tested for-or even forcibly treated.78
The right  time to cut  off this  movement  toward  coercive  gov-
ernmental  decision  making,  and  the  concurrent  loss  of individual
decision making,  is at the outset.  Individuals should not be subject
to  coercion  concerning  medical  decisions-no  individuals. 79  Nor
should AIDS or pregnancy  be the occasion for special coercive legal
rules.
VII.  TESTING  THE  NEWBORN
Even  if the  pregnant  woman's  right not to  know  does protect
her from having  testing forced  upon  her, the issue of whether she
can prevent  the testing of her newborn at birth still remains.  One
consequence of the test will be that it reveals her HIV status.  In fact,
testing  the  mother is  the only  immediate  effect  of tests  performed
77.  See generally Gostin,  supra note 5, at  35-42.  Professor Gostin  concluded:
[T]he justifications  for fully informed  consent  to HIV testing,  then, are  that it
respects  a patient's  autonomy  and privacy  in law,  it complies  with the well-ac-
cepted  clinical  standards  of care, and  it maintains  the  ethical  integrity  of the
medical  profession  and the dignity and worth of the patient.
Id.  at 42.
78.  For the moment, most fetal conditions that can be detected are either not treata-
ble during pregnancy,  or treatment  is  highly  experimental  and, accordingly,  could  not
be forced  upon a  woman who  declined  to consent  to  it.  But unless the  law embodies
principles protecting  women's rights  to make their own medical  decisions during preg-
nancy, such women  may  become subject  to forced operations  as science  develops ways
to treat the fetus in utero.  Society should be able to develop medical  knowledge and the
opportunity for the treatment of fetuses without thereby coercing women  to submit to it.
79.  What  about "the  incompetent"?  I  believe  far too  many individuals  are consid-
ered to be in  that category and that more persons should  have control of more of their
own decisions.  However,  there  are some who cannot  in any  way understand the  deci-
sions being made or express any preference.  Whether the state or a substitute decision-
maker should then have control of the decision  is a matter of hot dispute.  See Conserva-
torship of Valerie  N.,  707 P.2d 760 (Cal.  1985)  (en banc)  (holding that a  state law  bar-
ring sterilization of persons  under a conservatorship impermissibly  interfered with their
privacy and liberty  interests).MARYLAND  LAW  REVIEW
shortly  after  birth.  All  babies  born  of HIV-positive  mothers  test
positive  for  the  virus  at  birth,80  even  though  less  than  a  third  of
them will  ultimately prove  to be infected.
The  only  tests  much  in  use  until  very  recently  check  for  the
presence  of HIV-related  antibodies  in the individual's  blood.  Dur-
ing the third trimester of pregnancy,  however, the mother transmits
her antibodies  to the fetus in order to provide  it with the protection
from  infection  it will need  once born.  These antibodies  remain  in
the  infant for as  long as  fifteen  to twenty-four  months  after birth.
Therefore,  a test for this antibody  in the infant (usually the enzyme-
linked immunosorbent assay or ELISA test) will be positive until the
mother's antibodies  disappear.  Under that test, the  infant will  test
positive at birth and for approximately  a year and a half thereafter,
regardless of whether the infant is one of the thirty percent actually
infected with  the virus.8"
Recently, several  tests have been developed that can determine
much earlier whether an infant has the virus, although still not relia-
bly until a few months after birth. 8 2  Current technology  is develop-
80.  See Martha M.  Curley, Note, Establishing Relieffor the Most Innocent of All AIDS  Vic-
tims:  Liability  for Perinatal  Transmission of AIDS, 28J. FAM.  L. 271,  275 (1989/1990)  ("An-
tibodies  are  transmitted  to  the  fetus  in  every  case,  and  half of the  babies  who  test
positive to HIV  are born with visible signs of clinical illness.").
81.  See Field,  supra note 24,  at 98-99.
82.  There  are currently  several other  kinds of tests-for  markers  other  than  HIV
seropositivity.  They still cannot detect whether the infant has the virus immediately af-
ter birth, but they  can  as  early as three  to six  months.
First, the HIV Culture Test works by extracting blood from the infant and then using
this blood  to attempt  to grow the virus.  If  the virus  is detected, the infant is  infected.
(The specificity of the culture is almost  100%.)  If  the result is negative, however,  there
is still at least a 5-10%  chance that the infant may be infected.  When this culture is taken
at birth, the sensitivity drops to less than 50%.  Moreover, results are generally not avail-
able for two  or three  weeks,  because it  takes  that  long to  grow  the virus.  The chief
problems  with  the HIV Culture Test  are this time lag and its  expense.
A  second  test,  called  the  Polymerase Chain Reaction  (PCR),  works  by  determining
whether or not viral DNA exists in the infant's blood; if  viral DNA is  detected, the child
is  almost  certainly infected,  as  long  as  the test  has  been performed  in  an experienced
laboratory.  This  test also is  usually conducted when  the infant  is three  to  six months
old.  Like the  HIV Culture,  it  is  less  sensitive during the  first  few  months  of life  but
highly sensitive (greater than 90%) by three to six months of  age.  The PCR is quicker to
perform  than the HIV culture; the results can be obtained within forty-eight hours.  Be-
cause samples are often batched, however, the turnaround time is typically several days.
The PCR  is  likely soon  to  become  the  preferred  method  of early  diagnosis.  It  is
already becoming more widely used and  can be performed by  some commercial  labora-
tories.  Within  the  year, a kit for HIV diagnosis using  PCR  is  likely to be  available.
The P-24 Antigen  Test  is a third test.  It  works by looking at the infant's blood for the
presence of P-24, a protein component of HIV.  This test is limited by rare false positive
results that  can  occur  in  the  first  few  weeks  after birth,  and  by  its low  sensitivity.  A
recent modification  of the  P-24  Test has  significantly  improved  the  test's  sensitivity,
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ing rapidly.  At present, nearly all infected  infants can be identified
by  the time they are three  to six months  old. 83  Moreover, the new
types of tests-once both prohibitively expensive and capable of be-
ing performed only at a limited number of laboratories-are becom-
ing  more  generally  available.  Unless  an  infant  has  received  a
transfusion  or  another  procedure  that could  have  transmitted  the
HIV virus, these tests will still have the effect of indirectly  revealing
the HIV status of the mother.  (Fewer mothers  will be shown to be
positive  than previously,  because  only the infants  actually  infected
will  test positive,  so  the  status  of only  about thirty  percent  of the
mothers  who  are themselves  positive  will be revealed.)
Some  would  require the  testing of newborns  even during  the
period when the test would disclose  only the mother's HIV status  (a
period  ranging  from  the  first  three  months  to  the  first  fifteen
months of the child's life, depending on the test utilized).  After all,
the arguments  for the mother's bodily integrity and for her right to
decide her own  medical course, which weighed toward deferring  to
her during pregnancy,  no longer apply after  the child  is born.  The
mother is  no longer the one  on whom the test will be performed.
But the  right  a mother  has  traditionally  had  that does  require
deference to her at this stage is her right to decide upon the medical
treatment  of her child. 8 4  Usually  parents  are asked  to  consent  to
medical  procedures  performed  on  an  infant,  and  physicians  who
treat children without parental consent expose  themselves to liabil-
without apparent loss of specificity.  See Steven A.  Miles et al.,  Rapid Serologic Testing with
Immune-Complex-Dissociated HIV p24 Antigen for Early Detection of HIV Infection  in Neonates,
328 NEw  ENG. J. MED.  297 (1993).
Another  test, called  the  IGA  Antibody  Test,  works  by  detecting  a  particular  type of
antibody which  the infant herself will begin  to develop  to combat the virus;  it is an an-
tibody  that does not  cross  the placenta.  This  test  is  hopeful  because  it  can  be easily
performed  at  commercial  laboratories-rather  than  only  at  university  research  facili-
ties-and  can be performed  more inexpensively  than the others.  The test is not useful
before  six  months  of age,  however.  Though  IGA  detection  is  very  specific,  it  is  also
highly  insensitive  in the first  few months of life.  Interview  with  Mary Jo O'Hara,  supra
note  15; Conversations with Dr. Robert Husson,  Children's  Hospital, Boston, MA,  Feb.
1993.
83.  See  Conversations  with Dr. Husson, supra note 82.
84.  If the father is involved in the decision-making  process and he disagrees with the
mother, the state might accept  his consent  in place of the mother's in order  to test and
protect the child.  See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 454 (1990)  (stating that "[i]n
virtually  every state, the consent of one parent is enough  ...  to  submit  [a child]  to any
medical or surgical procedure  other than an abortion" and to permit the child to partici-
pate  as  a  subject  in  most  forms  of medical  research);  see also 45  C.F.R.  §§  46.404-05
(1988).
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ity."5  A  parental  refusal  to  consent  to  a proposed  medical proce-
dure will  be overridden  only  if the procedure  is greatly  needed  by
the  infant  and  the  withholding  of  parental  consent  is  highly
unreasonable. s6
Proponents  of AIDS  testing  of newborns,  however,  point  to
mandatory  programs  for screening  newborns  for  phenylketonuria
(PKU),  which  are widely accepted.  Parental consent has not always
been  considered necessary  for  PKU screening.  PKU  is a hereditary
metabolic  disorder  that  has  an  incidence  of approximately  1  in
12,000  to  15,000  live  births."  It  is  characterized  by  the  develop-
ment of severe  mental retardation;  ninety-five  percent  of those  af-
fected have IQs of less than fifty.  Unlike  HIV, PKU is not fatal;  nor
is  it transmitted vertically.
Most significantly, unlike  HIV, early  treatment of PKU  actually
prevents  the  development  of retardation  in ninety-five  percent  of
the infants treated.8"  Moreover, the treatment is comparatively sim-
ple.  It  involves  restricting  the  infant's  intake  of  phenylalanine
(found in a few foods, like fava beans) beginning before the infant is
four weeks old.  Given the low cost, safety, and accuracy of the PKU
test, as  well as the availability of very simple and effective treatment
for  this  disease,  forty-three  states  established  mandatory  testing
programs  during  the  decade  following  the  development  of PKU
testing.89
85.  Bonner v.  Moran,  126 F.2d  121,  122-23  (D.C. Cir. 1941)  (remanding  an assault
and battery action for new trial so that the jury could be instructed that the consent of a
parent, not that of her  15-year-old  son, was necessary  before  the defendant plastic sur-
geon could  legally remove  a skin patch from  the son for the benefit  of his cousin).
86.  See,  e.g.,  State v. Perricone,  181  A.2d 751,  759 (N.J.  1962)  (finding that while the
"appellants  evidenced sincere parental concern and affection for their child [,]... courts
have held that the refusal of parents, on religious grounds, to submit their infant child to
a blood  transfusion  necessary  to  save its  life  or mental  health  amounted  to  statutory
neglect"), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962);  People ex  rel. Wallace  v. Labrenz,  104  N.E.2d
769,  774  (Ill.  1952)  ("Neglect  . . . is  the  failure  to  exercise  the  care  that  the circum-
stances justly demand.  It embraces  wilful as well as  unintentional disregard  of duty."),
cert. denied, 344 U.S.  824 (1952).
87.  See  Lori  B.  Andrews,  Torts and the Double Helix:  Malpractice Liability for Failure to
Warn of Genetic Risks,  29  Hous.  L.  REV.  149,  168  (1992)  (noting  that  "all  states  have
newborn screening programs which screen every infant for phenylketonuria"  and reiter-
ating  the  risk  of the  disorder  actually  striking  any  particular  child  as,  at  most,  1  in
12,000).
88.  See  Acuff & Faden, supra note 76,  at 64.
89.  Id. at 65.  The  first state to begin a voluntary screening  program  was Massachu-
setts.  That  early effort  was very successful.  Yet,  in spite of the widespread  testing that
was  conducted during  the  voluntary  regime,  Massachusetts  was  also  the first  state  to
adopt a mandatory screening  program, due largely to pressure from the National  Asso-
ciation for Retarded  Children and  certain  state health officials.
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In  many respects,  PKU  screening serves  as  the paradigm for a
procedure  to  which  parents  cannot  effectively  withhold  consent.
Early  treatment  is  simple and  works  to  eliminate  the  harm associ-
ated with  the  disease,  while nontreatment  of the infected  child  re-
sults in  a near-certainty  of serious disability.
It is a much more  difficult judgment whether AIDS testing,  on
the  other hand,  satisfies  requirements  for  overriding  parental  re-
fusal  of consent.  The current  balance of benefits and  burdens that
will  result from  a mandatory  test suggests  that it is  still reasonable
for  a parent to refuse  AIDS testing and early treatment-more rea-
sonable than  it would be in the case of PKU.
As  benefits  of early  knowledge  of HIV  status  increase,  many
more mothers  will consent voluntarily  to testing, as long  as care  is
available  for  their  children.  When  therapy  is  both  effective  and
available, society will have to face the question whether denial of the
medical  benefits  that would result  from  testing is  abusive,  so  that
parents  are not permitted to deny consent.90  We are not yet there,
in terms of either effectiveness  or availability  of therapy, but there
are more benefits  from early detection than  there were a few years
ago.
In making judgments  about how reasonable  it is  for parents to
refuse consent to testing, it is important  to weigh  in negative social
and economic effects of learning HIV-positive status.  We  also must
differentiate between the period,  shrinking though it is, in which the
test  will  reveal only  the mother's  HIV-infection  status  and the pe-
riod when the infant's own status can  be tested.  The important dif-
ference is that, as a group, newborns  who test positive during the first
period  (about seventy percent of whom are not really  infected) will
not benefit  from aggressive  treatment  from  birth.  Indeed,  AZT-
the  most  frequently  used  treatment  for  AIDS-can  cause  severe
toxic effects.9'  Thus, it is both dangerous and wholly without bene-
fit to those infants  who are not infected but  still test positive.
Part of the  puzzle  about whether  HIV-positive  parents  should
be compelled  to consent either to testing or to immediate treatment
90.  And if consent to testing is  to be forced,  should it be forced upon all parents  of
newborns-or  only on women known  to be HIV positive?  See infra Part IX.
91.  See Douglas D. Richman et al.,  The Toxicity of Azidothymidine (AZT) in the Treatment  of
Patients with AIDS  and AIDS-Related Complex:  A  Double-Blind, Placebo-Controlled Trial, 317
NEW  ENG. J. MED.  192,  193  (1987)  (finding treatment-associated  toxic effects, including
nausea, headaches, myalgins, and anemia); Rhoda S. Sperling et al., A  Survey of Zidovudine
Use in Pregnant Women  with Human Immunodeficiency  Virus Infection, 326  NEw  ENG.  J.  MED.
857  (1992).  Cf. Tierney, supra note 2,  at  482  (noting that  "people  taking  AZT  often
show  increasing viral  resistance  to the drug").
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for their newborns  is the traditional position of our legal and medi-
cal systems  that parents should not even be able to consent to medi-
cal  procedures  to be performed  on their  child when  any  expected
benefit  is not really  for the child  herself.  It is  considered  inappro-
priate  to use  the child for the benefit of another person  or for the
benefit of society as a whole.92  Adults  can and often do consent on
their own behalf to be research subjects out of altruistic motives-or
to donate bone marrow  or a kidney to a  loved one-but it is  much
more  troublesome  when  a  parent  agrees  for  her  child  to  be  so
used.93
But the relevance of that doctrine is not obvious  in the context
of neonates  with HIV-positive  mothers.  There is,  after all,  a thirty
percent  chance  that  the  child  will  benefit from  current  treatment.
Perhaps the uncertainty and the gambling character of whatever  de-
cision is made during this period suggest the wisdom of adhering to
traditional practice  and deferring  to parental  discretion.
In  1990, one set of authors  summarized the balance of consid-
erations  thus:
Currently,  and  for  the  foreseeable  future,  programs  of
newborn  screening  are de facto programs  testing for HIV
92.  For a sampling of the debate surrounding this issue, see generally PAUL  RAMSEY,
THE PATIENT  AS  PERSON  14-15  (1970)  (arguing that while no one  should be able to  give
consent for a child to undergo "[niontherapeutic,  nondiagnostic experimentation,"  par-
ents may have consented to Salk polio vaccine testing of a healthy child because it was a
potentially  "therapeutic"  procedure  used  to  combat  "epidemic  conditions");  Richard
McCormick,  Proxy Consent in the Experimental  Situation, in 18  PERSPECTIVES  IN  BIOLOGY  AND
MEDICINE  2,  14  (Autumn  1974)  (maintaining that "when  a particular experiment would
involve  no  discernible risks,  no notable  pain, no  notable  inconvenience, and  yet hold
promise of considerable  benefit,"  vicarious consent  is permissible.  But consider  that,
under  this analysis, parental consent to a kidney  transplant from  one three-year-old  to
another  lacks  moral justification).  See also Charles  Fried,  Children as Subjects for Medical
Experimentation, in RESEARCH  ON  CHILDREN  107 (J. van Eys  ed.,  1978); Additional Protec-
tions for Children  Involved as Subjects in Research,  48 Fed.  Reg. 9814 (1983)  (discuss-
ing regulations governing research  on children).
93.  See Curran  v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d  1319 (Ill. 1990)  (surveying decisions of several
states regarding whether consent  by court, parent, or guardian to the removal of a kid-
ney  from  a child or  an  incompetent  person  for  transplantation to  a sibling  is legally
effective,  and finding that  the  key inquiry is whether  or not such removal is in the do-
nor's  best interest).  The position taken in Curran is not necessarily decisive in  the AIDS
context, though.  A parent  might decide that testing may be of some benefit to her child
since her child does  have a 30%  chance of being infected.  The parent might reason that
the  benefit  that  would  adhere  if  this  30%  probability became a reality  outweighs  the
harms  that  would  occur  if  the child were  not infected.  It  is  the  significance of these
opposing  factors  that  makes  the  parent's  decision a reasonable  one whatever she  de-
cides, and prevents such parental choices from being overridden.  If the parental motive
were  purely altruistic, and without possible benefit to  the child, parental consent would
probably not be  considered legitimate.
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infection  in the mother, not the infant...  [N]ewborns  and
their mothers are a family unit; when HIV-infected mothers
experience  social  or  institutional  discrimination,  their  in-
fants  suffer  as well.  Human  immunodeficiency  virus-posi-
tive  newborns-70%  of  whom  are  not  themselves
infected-face  the further risk of being abandoned by their
mothers, difficulties  with adoption and  foster home place-
ments, and difficulties  in access  to  day  care.
At  present,  the  expected  benefits  to  newborns  from
HIV testing do not clearly outweigh  these risks  or the pri-
vacy  and  autonomy  interests  of their  mothers.  Although
there are few experimental  data on this point, we  are per-
suaded  that for the  approximately  30%  of newborns  who
are infected,  the prospects for medical  benefits  are signifi-
cant and would  be enhanced  by early identification  of "at
risk"  status.  Currently  available  benefits  include  the pre-
vention  or delay of death through Pneumocystis carini pneu-
monia  prophylaxis  and  the  prospect  that  antiviral
treatment  may  lengthen  and  improve  the  quality  of life,
particularly  with  regard  to  cognitive  development.  How-
ever, for  the approximately  70%  of newborns  who  would
be  identified  as  being  at  increased  risk  because  maternal
antibodies  are  detected  but  who  turn  out  not  to  be  in-
fected,  the benefit-to-harm calculus  may well tip in the op-
posite  direction.  For both  groups  of newborns,  access  to
adequate medical care is  by no means guaranteed.  Where
the  interests  of newborns  are  so  difficult  to  discern  and
evaluate,  there is no moral justification for substituting the
judgment of the state  or the health professional for that of
the parent.94
But even at that early date, some balanced the risks  differently.
At  least  one  state  provided  by  statute  that  parental  consent  rules
change when HIV  is at issue.  In  1989,  Rhode  Island enacted  a law
providing  that,  despite  its  requirement  of particularized  informed
consent  for  HIV testing  in most  settings,  an HIV  test may  be per-
formed at  the discretion  of the health care  provider on any  patient
less than one year old without any consent.95  North Carolina allows
such  testing  but  only  when  a  "parent  or guardian  has  refused  to
consent  to such  testing  and  there  is  reasonable  suspicion  that  the
minor  has AIDS  virus or HIV  infection  or that  the child  has  been
94.  Working  Group on HIV Testing of Pregnant Women  and  Newborns, supra note
31,  at 2418-19.
95.  See  R.I.  GEN.  LAws  § 23-6-14(a)  (1989).
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sexually abused." 96
Even if it is accepted  that parents have discretion to refuse con-
sent to testing or treatment during the period when it is not possible
to tell whether the particular infant is actually infected, the dilemma
becomes  more difficult  when  the  child can be accurately  tested  for
her own status.  Perhaps the most crucial variable  bearing upon the
reasonableness  of a parent's refusal to consent  even  at this stage  is
the  degree  of medical  benefit  that will  flow  from  the intervention.
Not  only  advances  in diagnosis  but also  advances  in  therapy have
been occurring rapidly.
Today we  know there are clear benefits  to neonates  from early
detection and treatment.  More early therapy is administered than in
the past.  Asymptomatic  infants  do not receive AZT,97  but infected
infants  with  below  age-normal  T-4  cell counts  usually are  treated
with AZT.98  Moreover  most  infants  born  to women  known  to  be
HIV  infected  are  given  different  types  of inoculations  than  other
children, and their T-cell count is monitored regularly.  These treat-
ments  carry  little  risk  to infants  who  are not  in fact  HIV  positive
while they  benefit those who are infected.
In addition,  most infants  born to women  known to  be HIV in-
fected do receive  Bactrim, an antibiotic, until the HIV-infection sta-
tus and immune status of the infant are determined.  The purpose is
to help  those who  are  infected  ward  off pneumocystis  pneumonia
(PCP).  This  type of pneumonia  is  the major lethal  complication  of
pediatric HIV infection.  An  ethical dilemma concerning mandatory
testing does exist because PCP is highly preventable with treatment,
but treatment is only administered when the mother or child is iden-
tified  as  HIV  infected.  Moreover  PCP  prophylaxis  seems  clearly
sound  and  beneficial.  Improved  neurologic  function  has  clearly
been  demonstrated  in response  to  antiretroviral  treatment.  Most
agree that antiretroviral  therapy prolongs  life and prolongs the pe-
riod without disease  in asymptomatic  adults.  Measurable  effects  of
AZT have been the same in children as in adults,  although placebo-
controlled  trials  in children  have not been done (and will not be).99
96.  N.C.  GEN.  STAT.  §  130A-148(h)  (1989  & Supp.  1991).  See  also  LA.  REV.  STAT.
ANN.  § 40:1300:13(F)(6)  (West Supp.  1992)  (allowing testing of children without paren-
tal  consent  when  the  attending  physician  deems  it necessary  to  properly  diagnose  or
treat  the child).
97.  See  supra notes  53-55  for  a discussion  of  FDA Clinical  Protocol  076, in  which
infants  born  of HIV-infected  women do receive  AZT for  the first  six weeks  of life.
98.  See  Conversations  with Dr.  Husson, supra note 82.
99.  Id.
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These  facts  about  available  therapies  increase  pressure  to  cut
off the  requirement  that  parents  consent  before  identified  testing
occurs.  The  availability  of  therapy  makes  decisions  about
mandatory  testing  more difficult  than  they  were  a  few  years  ago.
Moreover,  the balance of advantages  may change rapidly.  At some
point  the  medical profession  may  be  able to  demonstrate  that  the
clear  benefits available  to the child who tests positive outweigh  the
economic and  societal disadvantages  that such  a diagnosis may im-
pose upon him.  Certainly, if treatment options develop so that rea-
sonable  persons  would  not differ  as  to whether  it was  to  the clear
advantage of the child to know her status and proceed with available
treatment, parents  might not be permitted to block  testing and  re-
sulting treatment,'0 0 just as they cannot block PKU  testing.  But we
have not yet arrived  at that scenario.
As long as reasonable persons can differ as to the proper course
of treatment,  the state  should not intrude  on  the decisions  of par-
ents.  It is  important to note that it is a  reasonable decision  that is
required here-not the reasonable one, or the one that seems  best.
The decision  need  only be within  the realm  of rational  choice, for
the parent's  choice  to be  followed.  It  is  only  in extreme  circum-
stances  that government  choice replaces  parental  choice.  Pediatric
AIDS is  a serious  problem and needs  to be  combated, but  this fact
should  not be used  to make  inroads  upon  our longstanding  rules
concerning parental authority.  Today the medical benefits deriving
from testing  are not  so compelling  that a parental  decision not to
take  the  risks  involved  is  an abusive  decision, warranting  forcible
displacement  of parental  authority  under  prevailing  principles  of
child abuse.
VIII.  DEVELOPING  APPROPRIATE  TREATMENTS
In part because parental refusal of consent is so reasonable,  it has
been difficult  to develop  conclusive  information about which  treat-
ments will be beneficial  to newborns.  It is crucial to know both what
will help those who are infected and which procedures will be harm-
100.  Most courts  have refused to intervene to  override parental  objections when  the
health problem at issue  is not life threatening.  Compare In re Seiferth,  127  N.E.2d  820,
823 (N.Y.  1955)  (finding that a court "has  power in drastic situations to direct [an] opera-
tion over the objection of parents"  (emphasis added))  with In re Sampson,  317 N.Y.S.2d
641,654  (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1970)  (concluding that the court's power  is not limited to "dras-
tic situations"), aft'd, 328  N.Y.S.2d  686  (1972).  Similarly,  an advantage  that comes  to
the child  from treatment but that will not actually save or very significantly prolong  the
child's life might not be considered significant enough to warrant the extraordinary  step
of overriding  parental consent.
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ful  to the  seventy  percent  who  are  seropositive  but not in  fact  in-
fected.  Moreover, we need  to develop knowledge  and strategies to
avoid those harms.
Without  testing  and  experimentation  on  newborns  and  their
use as research  subjects,  it is difficult for drugs  to be approved  for
infants.  And  if the drugs are not approved,  doctors  may  risk per-
sonal liability in prescribing those drugs for infants, even if parental
consent has been given.  Without such experimentation,  it is difficult
to  accumulate  medical  knowledge  that  could  be  beneficial  to  such
children.  The research  already done in the AIDS area involves  pri-
marily gay, white, adult males, and  may or may not be applicable in
this  very different  context.
Today  many  children  are  enrolled  in clinical  trials  concerning
treatment for HIV.  Better medical treatment is  expected to develop
as a result, which will benefit seropositive infants as a group.  None-
theless, a  reluctance  to experiment  with newborns or to consent to
yet-untried treatments on one's own child is extremely understanda-
ble and is  well within  parental authority.101
Developing  appropriate  drug  treatments  and  other  therapies
for infants poses  yet another  ethical  dilemma.  Many  children  who
test  positive  for  HIV  are  abandoned  or  orphaned  and  then  are
placed in  group homes or in foster care.  Often the state acts in loco
parentis for these children.  Should the government be permitted to
consent to aggressive  treatment  of those children?  One advantage
is  development of more information  on the proper medical  course
for seropositive children.  However,  there are obvious objections to
government  harvesting a population of research  subjects  by way of
the foster care system.  Drug testing using children as  subjects must
not  be limited  to or  consist primarily of this group of children,  as
might  occur  with broad  governmental  consent  for its wards.  Cer-
tainly, during the period when there is a seventy percent chance that
101.  Similarly,  comparatively  little research  has  been  done  on  the  effect  of various
treatments on HIV-positive pregnant women  because of a reluctance to experiment at a
time when the fetus might be harmed and when medical  personnel might subject them-
selves  to liability.  On current  efforts  to  include  consenting  pregnant women  in  more
clinical  trials,  especially  those  involving  drugs  that might  prevent  transmission  of the
virus  to  the fetus, see  Deborah  Cotton, AIDS,  Clinical  Research  and  Drug Regulation
(work in  progress  for  the National  Academy  of Sciences  Panel on the  Social  Impact of
AIDS).
For an excellent discussion of the myriad  ways in which  the needs of women,  preg-
nant or not, in  relation to  the AIDS  epidemic  have been neglected,  see Nan  D. Hunter,
Complications of Gender:  Women  and HIV Disease, in  AIDS  AGENDA  EMERGING  ISSUES  IN
CIVIL  RIGHTS  5  (Nan  D.  Hunter  & William  Rubenstein  eds.,  1992).
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any  treatment will not be beneficial  to the particular child,  govern-
mental consent to such  experimental  treatments  is problematic.
IX.  TARGETING
Another extremely  difficult  issue  has been raised  in the devel-
opment  and  administration  of  our  AIDS  policies-the  issue  of
targeting.  The  economic  impossibility of universal,  identified  test-
ing  or  even  of  large-scale  identified  testing  of  low-prevalence
groups, and the consequent  necessity of targeting in any such test-
ing, are still further reasons why mandatory testing is unacceptable.
There  is  an  alternative:  universal,  anonymous  testing.  Some
states  have  tested  all infants  on an  anonymous,  unidentified  basis,
thereby compiling useful data about the incidence  of AIDS.' 0 2  It is
not the  universal  testing itself that  is  economically  impossible  but
the post-test  counseling.  In addition,  pre-test  counseling  imposes
very  large  costs  when  informed  consent  is  required.  Anonymous,
unidentified testing avoids these costs and can be administered even
universally, 1 0 3  but  those  tested  also  do  not  obtain  treatment
benefits.
Universal  identified  testing  for  HIV  infection,  where  those
tested will learn of their status and have opportunities for treatment,
could not work efficiently.1 04  Indeed, any large-scale identified test-
ing of low-prevalence populations  is unlikely to work.  Money spent
in  such testing  would  be much  better  spent in  some  other way  to
fight the AIDS epidemic.
The experience in Illinois, when the state required AIDS testing
as  a  precondition  to  obtaining  a  marriage  license,  illustrates  this
point.  The Illinois  statute required  that both members  of a couple
be informed of either one's HIV status,  but it did not prohibit mar-
riage based on a positive result.'0 5  During 1988, the program's first
102.  See,  e.g.,  Lawrence  Feinberg, D.C. to  Test Newborns,  Clinic Patients  for AIDS, WASH.
POST,  Aug. 18,  1988, at D5 (noting a District of Columbia  plan to conduct mass, anony-
mous  testing  for AIDS  of all  infants  born  in  the  city  during one  month,  as  part of a
federally financed,  multistate program  to track the spread  of the disease);  Robert Stein-
brook, State Proposes  Anonymous  Testing of Infantsfor AIDS,  L.A. TIMES, Jan.  15,  1988, at  1
(noting similar  testing in  California and  New York).
103.  See  Conversations with  Dr. Husson, supra note  82.
104.  See Price, supra note 3,  at 446 (noting that universal testing might be "a  method-
ology  for  ensuring  precise  and  accurate  data  on  the developing  epidemiology  of the
disease"  but  admitting  that  "[r]ealistic  proposals,  however,  are  targeted  at  specific
populations"); H. Rutherford Turnbull, III et al., Mandatory  AIDS Testing  for Persons with a
Developmental Disability in  Residential Facilities, 39  U.  KAN.  L.  REV.  585,  602-03  (1991)
(finding universal  testing "inappropriate"  as "both  under and over inclusive").
105.  ILL.  ANN.  STAT.  ch. 40, para.  204(b)  (Smith-Hurd 1934  & Supp.  1992).
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year  in existence,  only  one in  7000  people tested  was  found to  be
HIV  positive,  at  an estimated  total  capital  cost  of $5.6  million. °6
This translated into a cost of $243,000 in order to identify each per-
son testing HIV positive through that program. 0 7  The effect of the
Illinois law, and the fact that the cost of the testing was passed on to
the individuals  who were  tested,'08  discouraged  some people  from
marrying at all, and encouraged  others to marry out of state.'0 9  Af-
ter a year and a half, Illinois  repealed  the statute." 0
There is no evidence that pregnant women have any higher per-
centage of AIDS than the general population.  There is no reason to
think mandatory testing of that group would  be any  more effective
than the mandatory premarital testing  in Illinois.  When politicians
argue otherwise, it is invariably for political reasons, not for any real
health care objective.  Accordingly, even when a statute provides for
mandatory  testing  of pregnant  women,  as  does  the  Florida  stat-
ute, "'  in practice  it is applied only to so-called high-risk groups."12
106.  Telephone Interview  with JeffJohnson,  Legislative Liaison,  Illinois  Department
of Public Health  Uan.  20, 1989).
107.  Id.  The Chicago Tribune estimated the cost at $228,000  per positive test result.
Repeal the Premarital  AIDS  Test Law, CHI.  TRIB., Jan. 6,  1989, at  18,  col.  1. (editorial).
108.  While the  average cost  per test  was  $35,  the Illinois  Department  of Health  has
anecdotal  information  that  physicians  were  charging  as much as  $125  for testing  and
certification.  Interview  with JeffJohnson, supra note  106.
109.  See Field, supra note 24,  at 75-76.
110.  Daniel Egler & Rick Pearson, Premarital  AIDS  Test Law Repealed, CHI.  TRIB., Sept.
12,  1989,  at  1,  col. 5.
Because universal identified testing does not work in the area of AIDS research, and
because it wastes money, almost no programs  attempt  it or force  testing on low-preva-
lence populations.  The  exception  is the  United States  military,  which  has,  by  far,  the
largest HIV  testing program  in  the world.  It  spends hundreds  of millions  of taxpayer
dollars to test applicants and active  duty personnel,  finding a  1.4  and  1.3  per thousand
seroprevalence  rate,  respectively.  For  a discussion  and  critique of the military  testing
program, see Field, supra note 24, at 75-76  (citing Centers  for Disease  Control, Trends in
Human Immunodeficiency  Virus Infection Among  Civilian Applicants for Military Service-United
States,  October 1985-March 1988, 37 MORBInY  &  MORTALITY  WEEKLY  REP. 677 (1988));
Centers  for  Disease  Control, Prevalence of Human Immunodeficiency  Virus Antibody  in  U.S.
Active-Duty Military Personnel, Apr. 1988,  37  MORBIDITY  &  MORTALITY  WEEKLY  REP. 461
(1988).
111.  See supra note  19.
112.  Such discrimination in application is unconstitutional  to the same extent as if the
discrimination  were part of an enacted  statute, according to  the venerable  precedent of
Yick Wo  v.  Hopkins,  118  U.S.  356 (1886).  However, such discrimination  may be hard to
prove  because the Supreme Court often requires  a showing of intent to discriminate  if
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desire  to discriminate  on the part of the government before unconstitutionality  will  be
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Targeting high-risk  groups for mandatory  testing makes  more
sense economically  than universal mandatory identified testing, but
brings with  it problems of its own.  In the context of pregnancy, the
groups who would be targeted would be poor and minority popula-
tions living in  the inner cities of a few metropolitan  areas,  because
those are the groups  of women where  the concentration of HIV in-
fection  is the highest." l3  Targeting  by such  socioeconomic  criteria
is common  in  the context of AIDS,  but  it is  also highly discrimina-
tory.'14 Targeting  poor women of color is unjust for many reasons.
First, huge personal costs can  accompany  testing.  Moreover, while
race, geography,  and socioeconomic  status  do define  the group  of
women that currently has the highest HIV prevalence, none of those
factors  is  the "fault"  of the women  in  the group, and most of the
group is not and never will be HIV infected.  To impose mandatory
testing  only on this group  not only  encourages a  false  sense of se-
curity in other women regarding their risk of infection, but also un-
fairly  and  inaccurately  labels  the  targeted  women  as  "sources  of
contagion.,"1 5  It is difficult to justify adding such stigma to a group
who is  already oppressed.
Given  the  high  cost  of testing  low-prevalence  populations  of
pregnant women and the discrimination inherent in testing targeted
groups of pregnant women, the better way  to combat vertical trans-
mission  of  HIV  is  through  education,  counseling,  and  prenatal
care." t 6  Many  women, including a  great many in  groups most vul-
nerable to AIDS, either receive no prenatal care or none until late in
pregnancy."  7  There is no question that, because of both AIDS and
the interest in newborns'  health  generally,  prenatal  care should be
made available  to all pregnant women,  and information concerning
AIDS should be offered in conjunction  with it.
Questions  concerning  targeting  have  also  been  raised  apart
from testing or other government coercion.  There is concern about
targeting even in connection with providing information, education,
counseling, and even free voluntary testing.  If government  concen-
113.  Over 72%  of the women in the United States who have AIDS are either black or
Hispanic, while only  19%  of all U.S. women are black or Hispanic.  Centers for Disease
Control, AIDS  in  Women-United States,  39  MORBIDIrY  & MORTALITY  WEEKLY  REP.  845
(1990).
114.  See  Working  Group on  HIV Testing  of Pregnant  Women  and  Newborns,  supra
note 31,  at 2419.
115.  Id.; see also Field, supra note  24, at 61-63.
116.  See  Field,  supra note 24,  at 96-97.
117.  See GEORGE  WASH.  UNIV.,  1 INTERGOVERNMENTAL  HEALTH  POLICY  PROJECT AIDS:
A  PUBLIC  HEALTH  CHALLENGE  2-2, 2-28  (M.  Rowe  & X.  Ryan  eds.,  1987).
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trates its  outreach efforts  on particular  groups, the  same risk exists
of government  branding  those  groups  as  "sources  of contagion."
At the same time, it is  understandable that government would want
to  use  its  limited  resources  to  benefit  those  most  in  need.  Of
course, it would be best to educate and inform everyone and to pro-
vide  free  and  voluntary  testing  to  all who  desire  it."l'  But where
that cannot  be done, targeting, though problematic, is  considerably
less troublesome  when  applied  to outreach  efforts  that  do  not  in-
volve  coercion.
Any such targeting that occurs should be undertaken  with great
care  to avoid  stigmatization  to the  extent  possible.  Moreover,  it is
important  that sound  epidemiologic  research-not  simply racial  or
social class prejudice-guide  which populations  will be targeted." 19
CONCLUSION
Vertical  transmission  of  AIDS  is  a  serious  problem,  but
mandatory testing, either of pregnant women or of newborns,  is not
the appropriate solution  to try.  Not only does it violate established
rights  of pregnant women  or mothers  of newborns  to  test without
their consent.  It  also would be  counter-effective  to societal  efforts
to control the spread of HIV.  Coercion does not work in this con-
text.  Those who urge coercive methods are frequently motivated by
political  or  self-interested  rather  than  health  objectives,  or  are
moved  by panic  concerning  the  AIDS  epidemic  rather  than  a rea-
soned  and  informed  response.  The  grave  concern  that  the AIDS
epidemic justifiably causes  should not be the occasion for imposing
new coercive controls on pregnant women, on parents of newborns,
or on others.
We  must not lightly abandon  well-established  standards of in-
formed consent in a panicked response  to the AIDS epidemic.  Nor
should we abandon  our tradition  that decisions  concerning the ap-
propriateness of childbearing belong to parents and not to the state.
Altering such fundamental principles  in the context of the AIDS cri-
sis  would  contribute  nothing  to  controlling  the  epidemic.  The
thoughtless adoption of such a course would, in addition, have seri-
ous repercussions  throughout  our jurisprudence  and our society.
118.  Working Group on HIV  Testing of Pregnant  Women and Newborns,  supra note
31,  at  2416-17.
119.  See Robert  M.  Wachter  et  al.,  HIV Testing of Pregnant Women  and Newborns,  265
JAMA  1525  (1991).
436 [VOL.  52:402